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Prior to the late nineteenth century, little was done to 
preserve American wilderness, although its appreciation as 
both a natural and spiritual resource grew. With the 
approach of the twentieth century, protection of wilderness 
and forests areas began to occur. There developed, however, 
two very different arguments for protection. There were 
arguments for landscape conservation which considered 
forests as a natural, market resource. Others favored 
preservation of wilderness for more aesthetic and spiritual 
reasons. The tension between these two positions, still 
manifest in American wilderness politics, can be understood 
through the use of paradigms and subsequently presented as a 
reflection of the tension between the two competing 
paradigms.
Much of a political society's behavior is conditioned by 
its dominant social paradigm, which constitutes a society's 
beliefs, values, and ideals. American society's dominant 
paradigm —  Modernism —  developed out of historical 
elements including the Reformation, the Enlightenment, and 
the democratic, industrial, and scientific revolutions.
These in turn effected the conversion of wilderness into a 
mechanism or object of scientific inquiry and a material 
resource for a market economy. Modernism, however, was not 
without its challengers.
Throughout its development, Modernism remained in tension 
with its literary, philosophical, and scientific 
counterreactions. The literary alternative appreciated an 
immediate, personal, and effective relationship with nature 
rather than it as a mere mechanism. The philosophical and 
scientific alternatives recognized humankind as a part of 
nature, while the classical science of Modernism placed 
humans outside of and above it. Both these positions, 
Modernism and its challengers, came to be manifest in the 
attitudes regarding American wilderness.
An examination of the literature regarding paradigms and 
the development of wilderness protection suggests that the 
tension between Modernism and its counterreactions is 
reflected in the development of American perceptions of 
wilderness. Those arguing for use of forests as a natural, 
market resource represented the dominant paradigm of 
modernism. Those arguing for preservation of wilderness for 
spiritual reasons represented a competing paradigm. These 
two arguments remain in the present arguments for wilderness 
protection.
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EPILOGUE
REFERENCES
INTRODUCTION
This paper explores the concept of paradigms and their 
implications to the politics of wilderness preservation in 
America. In order to demonstrate the impact of paradigms 
with regard to American wilderness, this paper traces the 
history of the American preservation and landscape 
conservation movements from the late nineteenth through the 
mid-twentieth century to examine the tension between the 
competing paradigms of Modernism and its challengers. The 
purpose, then, of this paper is to explore paradigms and 
their influence on societal values and worldviews, and to 
suggest how paradigmatic tension is manifested in the 
history and politics of American wilderness.
In order to discuss paradigms and their role in 
understanding American attitudes toward wilderness, it is 
necessary to first define and delimit paradigms. As 
discussed in Chapter 1, much of a society's view of its 
place and relationship to the world is conditioned by its 
dominant social paradigm, which constitutes the beliefs, 
values, and ideals that influence members' thinking about 
their society, government, and individual responsibilities. 
When a paradigm fails to deal adequately with anomalies or
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crisis within their methods of perception, the paradigm 
shifts to one that will adequately account for the crisis 
and incorporates it into its methodology. It is important 
to note that scientific and societal paradigms address these 
anomalies very much in the same manner. The overall 
dominant social paradigm may be challenged over a very long 
period of time if its values and worldview do not adequately 
provide a constant and consistent interpretive framework for 
society and its members.
The chapters following the discussion of paradigms 
address the development of the dominant social paradigm of 
"Modernism," its views towards nature, and how it came to 
shape American attitudes towards nature so profoundly. 
Modernism and its roots run deep into the history of Western 
science and philosophy. Many of the perceptions and 
attitudes toward the natural world in which humankind found 
itself in nineteenth and early twentieth century were 
conditioned by this dominant paradigm and its institutions 
and still linger today: laissez faire economics, the power
of scientific thought and positivism, nature as a mechanism, 
and faith in technology are but a few examples. There were, 
however, competing paradigms to Modernism.
The counterreactions discussed in this paper are 
limited to those which accepted many of Modernism's goals, 
especially the goals of liberty, prosperity and individual 
development, but viewed Modernism’s scientific and
7
technological methodologies as either failing to provide a 
viable means of achieving or preventing the attainment of 
such ends. In each of these paradigms, however, Modernism 
and its counterreactions, the central concern remains the 
same —  humankind. The alternative conceptual frameworks of 
Modernism manifested themselves in not only literary 
counterreactions, but philosophical and scientific 
counterreactions as well.
Literary and philosophical counterreactions against 
Modernism and its treatment of nature, the subject of 
Chapters 3 and 4, can be seen in the work and thought of 
such thinkers as Rousseau, Kant, and Spinoza. Their legacy 
of challenging Modernism was taken up in America by the 
Transcendentalists and found articulation in the work of 
Ralph Waldo Emerson. Transcendentalism in turn shaped the 
thought of such a pivotal figure in wilderness preservation 
as Henry Thoreau. Wilderness, in the literary and 
philosophical counterreaction to Modernism, was imbued with 
an aesthetic, spiritual quality denied by Modernism's 
mechanistic science. These qualities ascribed to nature by 
Romantic thinkers would remain a central theme of, and help 
define, preservationism.
Yet, the philosophical and literary counterreactions 
provided only part of the challenge to Modernism. There was 
a scientific challenge as well, discussed in Chapter 5.
With the advent of the thought of scientists such as
8
Galileo, Descartes, Bacon, and Newton, nature in the 
Modernist worldview took on a quality of a mechanism.
Nature became the object of scientific study and was reduced 
to inanimate matter, to be understood solely in rational, 
mathematical, quantifiable terms. But, opposing this 
interpretation of nature were physico-theologists and 
arcadian scientists who attempted to treat nature as 
something more that a mere mechanism. Their view of nature 
held that it was an organic whole —  something more than the 
sum of its parts —  and that it ultimately was the result of 
the handiwork of God. Although the notion that nature 
revealed the designs of a creator figure eventually proved 
to be untenable, the notion of nature as a unified whole, 
and that humankind was part of that whole, led directly to 
the thought of Charles Darwin, whose influence is still felt 
today.
The literary, philosophical, and scientific 
counterreactions to Modernism were all manifested in the 
emerging views of preservation and landscape conservation 
(identified in the remainder of this thesis simply as 
"conservation") in the mid-to-late nineteenth century in 
America —  the subject of Chapter 6. Conservation and 
preservation can be seen as representative of the tension 
between the competing paradigms of Modernism and its 
challengers. Preservationists utilized literary and 
philosophical counterreactions to Modernism to argue for the
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preservation of wilderness for spiritual ends. 
Conservationists, although utilizing the scientific 
counterreactions, valued managed forest areas, not 
wilderness, for economic ends, rather than aesthetic ones. 
This economic utilitarianism of the conservationists, while 
challenging inefficient management and waste of natural 
resources, came to represent the dominant paradigm of 
Modernism.
The epilogue discusses the paradigmatic implications 
of preservation and conservation upon American attitudes 
towards wilderness. It discusses as well the possibility of 
a shift to a new, more mature view of technology. While 
this technology would remain committed to its initial 
promise of enhancing and liberating humankind, it could do 
so while preserving wilderness for those same ends as well. 
With this more •'advanced'1 technology, the liberation of 
nature would be made inseparable from the liberation of 
humankind.
CHAPTER 1
PARADIGMS
Introduction
Much of this thesis' concern lies with the perceptions 
of wilderness as conditioned by the dominant social paradigm 
of Modernism and the impact of Modernism upon the politics 
of wilderness preservation. This chapter introduces the 
idea of paradigms, their functions, and their political 
implications. Central to this discussion of paradigms are 
the views that societal paradigms behave in patterns similar 
to scientific paradigms, that paradigms have and do 
experience "anomalies," and that dominant social paradigms 
are in constant tension with their alternate or 
"counterreactive" paradigms.
The Dominant Social Paradigm
Much of a society's view of its place and relationship
with the world is conditioned by its dominant social
paradigm. A paradigm represents a typical conditioned
response, example, or pattern. According to Zachary Smith:
The dominant social paradigm [in the U.S.] 
constitutes those clusters of beliefs, values, 
and ideals that influence our thinking about 
society, government, and individual
10
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responsibilities. The DSP [dominant social 
paradigm] can be defined in various ways, but 
it includes acceptance of laissez-faire 
capitalism, individualism, growth, and 
progress, and a faith in science and 
technology. Our DSP has influenced the history 
of environmental policy, public attitudes 
toward the environment, and environmental 
regulations (Smith 1992, 7).
As society shapes and is shaped by its dominant 
paradigm, so too are science and worldviews shaped by models 
and patterns. These patterns, however, cannot address all 
the possible shortcomings of their particular conceptual 
framework and are not immune from change.
Anomalies and Change
Thomas Kuhn, in his work The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions. provides an example of how anomalies and change 
manifest themselves within scientific paradigms. The manner 
in which change occurs within scientific paradigms may also 
be employed to describe change within political society 
itself. Science or "normal science," as treated in Kuhn's 
volume, refers mainly to research based upon one or more 
past scientific achievements which some particular 
scientific community acknowledges for a time as supplying 
the foundation for its further practice (Kuhn 1970, 10).
Kuhn sees these views and achievements as being advanced 
through their use in textbooks.
"Textbooks," according to Kuhn, "expound the body of 
accepted theory, illustrate many or all of its successful
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applications, and compare these applications with exemplary 
observations and experiments" (Kuhn, 10). Prior to the use 
of textbooks, well-known classics of science performed a 
similar function. Kuhn lists such works as Aristotle's 
Phvsica. Newton's Princioia. Franklin's Electricity, and 
Lyell's Principles of Geology as serving to define the 
legitimate problems and methods of a research field for its 
community of practitioners. This in turn would come to 
influence the conceptual scheme or worldview of the society 
in which those practitioners operated. Such theories were 
able to do so for essentially two reasons. According to 
Kuhn:
Their achievement was sufficiently 
unprecedented to attract an enduring group of 
adherents away from competing modes of 
scientific activity. Simultaneously, it was 
sufficiently open-ended to leave all sorts of 
problems for the redefined group of 
practitioners to resolve (Kuhn, 10).
Through his analysis of paradigms, Kuhn contends that 
some accepted examples of actual scientific study provide 
models or patterns from which spring particular identifiable 
traditions of scientific research. Examples would include 
"Ptolemaic astronomy" or "Newtonian dynamics." According to 
Kuhn, the study of paradigms prepares the student for 
membership in the particular scientific community with which 
he will practice later (Kuhn, 11). Having been committed to 
learning the bases for their science from the same model or 
pattern, scientists of each particular field tend to accept
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the same fundamentals with little disagreement. Commitment 
to these bases and the apparent consensus it produces are 
prerequisites for the genesis and continuation of a 
particular research tradition (Kuhn, 11). As long as the 
paradigm addresses and account for facts, both old and new, 
scientists can get on with their jobs, which consists of 
solving the puzzles presented by the natural world 
(Hall 1963, 701).
Kuhn argues that the paradigm itself is not 
identifiable with any specific body of theory. The paradigm 
represents "the source of the methods, problem field, and 
standards of solution accepted by any mature scientific 
community at any given time," permitting selection, 
evaluation, and criticism (Kuhn, 102). Normal science and 
its particular worldview consists of working within the 
constraints of one paradigm, making it more explicit and 
precise, and actualizing its original goal by extending the 
knowledge of those facts that the paradigm displays as 
particularly revealing (Shapere 1971, 706).
As articulation of the paradigm takes place, anomalies 
arise, representing facts which cannot be accounted for or 
cannot be fashioned to fit within the paradigm —  a sort of 
failed theoretical Procrustean bed. These anomalies give 
rise to what Kuhn describes as revolutionary science ("non­
normal science"):
Confronted with an anomaly or with crisis, 
scientists take a different attitude toward
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existing paradigms, and the nature of their 
research changes accordingly. The
proliferation of competing articulations, the 
willingness to try anything, the expression of 
discontent, the recourse to philosophy and to 
debate over fundamentals, all these are 
symptoms of a transition from normal to 
extraordinary research (Kuhn, 90).
Scientific, and consequently, worldview revolutions are
inaugurated by a growing sense that an existing paradigm has
ceased to function adequately in the exploration of an
aspect of nature to which that paradigm itself had
previously pioneered. Kuhn's emphasis is that in such
revolutions the older paradigm is replaced in whole or in
part by a new paradigm (Shapere, 706).
The success of a new or revolutionary paradigm
necessitates a partial or full relinquishment of one set of
paradigmatic institutions in favor of another. In
describing the change from a Newtonian to Einsteinian world
view, Kuhn argues that:
This need to change the meaning of established 
and familiar concepts is central to the 
revolutionary impact of Einstein's theory.
Though subtler than the changes from 
geocentrism to heliocentrism...or from 
corpuscles to waves, the resulting conceptual 
transformation is no less decisively 
destructive of a previously established 
paradigm. We may even come to see it as a 
prototype for revolutionary reorientations in 
the sciences (Kuhn, 102).
Revolutions need not introduce new objects of study or even
concepts; rather, they consist of major displacements of the
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conceptual network through which the scientist and 
ultimately members of society view the world.
The idea of major conceptual displacements as a result
of paradigmatic shifts is not without its detractors. Two
main types of objections to Kuhn's work have been raised.
The first position questions the definition and use of
paradigms. According to Dudley Shapere:
[The] term [paradigm is, at its outset] applied 
to a set of recurrent and quasi-standard 
illustrations of various theories which are 
revealed in...textbooks, lectures, and 
laboratory exercises, [and] ultimately appears 
as... anything and everything that allows the 
scientist to do anything.. .the term is so vague 
that...it is difficult to identify what is 
supposed to be the paradigm (Shapere, 706).
The second major type of objection against Kuhn's view 
relates to the relativism suggested by his theory. With the 
determinative nature of the paradigm, Kuhn appears to deny 
the objectivity of facts and the choice, on objective 
grounds, between paradigms. He writes: "The competition
between paradigms is not the sort of battle that can be 
resolved by proofs...[but is more like] a conversion 
experience...[it is] simply a change demanded by the 
adoption of a new paradigm" (Kuhn, 140). Objectivity and 
progress, traditional interpretations of science, are 
abandoned by Kuhn to the point of holding that if the same 
terms continue to be used after a scientific revolution, 
those terms have different meanings (Shapere, 707).
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Paradigms and Political Society 
Despite these objections to paradigms, Kuhn's work 
offers a useful tool not only in the discussion of 
scientific paradigms but societal paradigms as well, and 
their impact upon society and its models and patterns of 
perception. In her work Ecological Revolutions. Carolyn 
Merchant makes use of Kuhn's thought regarding scientific 
revolutions in a most convincing manner. According to 
Merchant:
Thomas Kuhn [in The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions'! approached major transformations 
in scientific consciousness from a perspective 
internal to the workings of science and the 
community of scientists. Scientific paradigms 
are structures of thought shared by groups of 
scientists within which problems are solved.
When a sufficient amount of anomalies challenge 
a scientific theory, scientists construct new 
paradigms, thus initiating new scientific 
revolutions (Merchant 1989, 3).
Merchant sees the strength of Kuhn's theory in its
recognition of stable worldviews in science and philosophy
that exist over relatively long periods of time but that can
experience rapid change during periods of stress and crisis.
Paradigms are not limited, however, to stable
worldviews in science. Sheldon Wolin, in his article
"Paradigms and Political Theory," proposes that:
We conceive of political society itself as a 
paradigm. From this viewpoint society would be 
envisaged as a coherent whole in the sense of 
its customary political practices, 
institutions, laws, structure of authority and 
citizenship, and operative beliefs being 
organized and interrelated. A politically 
organized society contains definite
17
institutional arrangements, certain widely 
shared understandings regarding the location 
and use of political power, certain 
expectations about how authority ought to treat 
the members of society and about the claims 
that organized society can rightfully make upon 
its members...This ensemble of practices and 
beliefs may be said to form a paradigm in the 
sense that the society tries to carry on its 
political life in accordance with them.
Further, in its agencies of enforcement and in 
its systems of rules, a political society 
possesses the basic instrumentalities present 
in Kuhn's scientific community and employs them 
in analogous ways. Society, too, enforces 
certain types of conduct and discourages 
others; it, too, defines what sort of 
experiments —  in the form of individual or 
group actions —  will be encouraged, tolerated, 
or suppressed; by its complex organization of 
politics through legislatures, political 
parties, and the media of opinion, society also 
determines what shall count in determining 
future decisions (Wolin 1968, 149).
Furthermore, as a paradigm, political society is apt to
experience paradigmatic anomalies and counterreactions for
reasons similar to those experienced in the scientific
community.
Conclusion
The first step to understanding humankind is the 
creation of a model or models that come to dominate and 
penetrate its thought and action. According to Isaiah 
Berlin:
The history of thought and culture is, as Hegel 
showed with great brilliance, a changing 
pattern of great liberating ideas which 
inevitably turn into suffocating 
straightjacket, and so stimulate their own 
destruction by new emancipating, and at the
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same time, enslaving conceptions. The first 
step to understanding of men is the bringing to 
consciousness of the model or models that 
dominate and penetrate their thought and action 
(Berlin, quoted by Bernstein 1976, 57).
A useful tool in this step is the notion of paradigms.
Paradigms help to identify those clusters of beliefs,
values, and ideals that influence how individuals and
societies think about themselves, their government, and
their responsibilities. Furthermore, paradigms provide for
a society or community a set of instruments that allow the
promotion or repression of certain ideas or practices.
There are, however, additional elements regarding paradigms
that this focuses upon.
As noted by Hegel, perhaps most important is that 
patterns of thought once viewed as liberating inevitably 
turn into stifling constraints and in turn provide the seeds 
of their own destruction. There is in any paradigmatic 
scheme an ever-present tension between what has become the 
dominant paradigm and the underlying counterreaction to it.
A paradigm cannot manage successfully the entire array of 
anomalies discovered within its purview. The 
counterreaction or alternate to this paradigm seeks to 
answer these anomalies within its own framework of thought. 
When the dominant paradigm finally reaches a point where it 
can no longer successfully manage the anomalies presented to 
it, and maintain its theoretical and practical validity at 
the same time, the counterreaction will succeed the former
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paradigm as the dominant paradigm and a paradigmatic 
revolution will have taken place.
Paradigmatic revolutions at the societal level, 
however, are not necessarily as rapid as those that might be 
experienced in the scientific realm. The following chapters 
will show that what has come to be the dominant social 
paradigm of the Western world —  Modernism —  has, for more 
than the past three centuries, been constantly in a state of 
tension with literary, philosophic, and scientific 
counterreactions. Moreover, these chapters will show that 
this tension between the dominant social paradigm and its 
counterreactions manifests itself in conservation and 
preservation movements that developed in America in the mid- 
to-late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
CHAPTER 2
OLD WORLD ROOTS OF THOUGHT ABOUT WILDERNESS
Introduction
As noted in the previous chapter, the dominant social 
paradigm —  a society's values and beliefs cluster or 
worldview —  does much to influence societal behavior. In a 
discussion of the present values and worldviews that help 
form today's dominant social paradigm and its subsequent 
impact upon American views towards wilderness, it is 
necessary first to look briefly at America's Old-World 
antecedents and their influence on American perception and 
thought.
Wilderness and America
In his volume Wilderness and the American Mind.
Roderick Nash argues that wilderness is a basic ingredient
of American civilization. According to Nash:
From the raw materials of the physical 
wilderness Americans built a civilization, with 
the idea or symbol of wilderness they sought to 
give that civilization identity and 
meaning...Wilderness currently enjoys 
widespread and growing popularity... From the 
perspective of intellectual history, this 
appreciation of wilderness is nothing less than 
revolutionary. Ancient biases against the wild 
are deeply rooted in human psychology
20
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and in the human compulsion to understand, 
order and transform the environment in the 
interest of survival, and later, of success.
Wilderness was the unknown, the disordered, and 
[the] uncontrolled. A large portion of the 
energies of early civilizations was directed at 
defeating the wilderness nature controlling it 
in human nature. America knew these
imperatives first hand: the European colonists
reexperienced in America their old, insecure 
relationships to wilderness (Nash 1982, xi).
Thus the American attitude toward wilderness is far older,
more complex than normally assumed.
Before continuing the discussion of the old-world
roots of American attitudes toward wilderness, the term
wilderness must be defined. A useful tool in this case is
Nash's employment of a spectrum in which the notion of
wilderness may be understood. At one end of the spectrum is
an environment without any human activity or impact, while
at the other end of the spectrum civilization can be found.
This spectrum allows for nuances in the perception of
wilderness. According to Nash:
Wilderness and civilization become antipodal 
influences which combine in varying proportions 
to determine the character of an area. In the 
middle portions of the spectrum is the rural or 
pastoral environment (the ploughed) that 
represents a balance of the forces of nature 
and man. As one moves toward the wilderness 
pole from this midpoint, the human influence 
appears less frequently...On the other side of 
the rural range, the degree to which man 
affects nature increases. Finally, close to 
the pole of civilization, the natural setting 
that the wild and rural conditions share gives 
way to the purely synthetic condition that 
exists in a metropolis (Nash, 6).
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Vast, unmodified regions free of human influence are found 
closest to the wilderness pole. Areas, such as those 
forests envisioned by conservationists, managed by humans as 
reservoirs of natural resources, are moved by management 
activities away from the wilderness pole toward 
civilization. Such forest were not the goal of 
* preservationists.
The origins of European and American thought about 
nature and wilderness can be traced back to Greek 
philosophers, as well as to the principles provided by the 
Judeo-Christian tradition, that came to dominate Europe.
The principle theme of Western thought, expressed by this 
paper, is its placing humans apart from and above the world 
in which they reside.
The conceptual separation of humankind from the
natural world received much attention in classical Greek
philosophy and came to provide an important influence upon
the development of European wilderness values. A major
contribution of Greek philosophy to European thought was the
use of reason. According to Max Oelschlaeger:
Whatever [the Greeks] borrowed from either the 
ancients or their contemporaries they 
transformed through their commitment to reason.
No serious student of Western civilization 
underestimates the importance of the rise of 
Greek rationalism on our own live, for 'Reason' 
lurks always beneath its surface. Greek 
rationalism is often presented as a unique 
vantage point from which to view the evolution 
of the European mind towards civilization. The 
historical documents that survive show clearly 
a breaking away from
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primitive attitudes into progress and 
elementary science, from myths into disciplined 
acquisition of knowledge about the universe 
(Oelschlaeger 1991, 54).
Oelschlaeger points out, however, that there is within the
Greek tradition a tension between the Dionysian and
Apollonian worldviews. Although the lasting impression upon
the European mind was toward rational, reasoned thought, the
tension between the Apollonian rational and Dionysian
aesthetic remained, as will be discussed throughout the
following chapters.
Socrates, who served as the epitome of Greek rational
thought, contributed to Western philosophy the notion of a
homocentric universe. In Oelschlaeger's view, "What is
revolutionary is the Socratic conception of the good life as
essentially a reflective attending to and nurturing of the
soul" (Oelschlaeger, 56). The result shows humankind
turning its attention inward, away from the world that
surrounds it, and towards self-conscious reason. Although
human life was lived among an ever-changing and mutable
material world, Socrates identified this as a problem for
the soul to overcome. Knowledge, or a rational
understanding of a wise course of action, depended on forms
from outside of nature. According to Oelschlaeger:
In this attitude lurks the germ of a pervasive 
dualism and logocentrism, sometimes called 
Eurocentrism, that since the Greeks, has 
infected virtually all Western philosophy, 
science, and religion. Its effects on Western
24
civilization have been far-reaching and long- 
lasting (Oelschlaeger, 57).
Socrates ultimately argued that everything for mankind
seemed preordained and that nature was provided by the gods
for humanity's use.
Plato, primarily through his work Timaeus, continued 
in the Socratic tradition in viewing nature as something 
that could be acted upon by humans and maintained that 
humans could improve upon nature. Clarence Glacken believes 
that in a period that lacked precision measurements and 
instruments, high skill was achieved in carving, metal work, 
and the construction of complex monuments and buildings. 
Plato's "respect for artisanship," according to Glacken, 
"...lead[s] to [the] general idea [of] man as a being who 
can create order and beauty out of brute material, or more 
broadly, who can control natural phenomenon with a 
combination of intelligence and skill" (Glacken 1990, 46).
Aristotle refined the Socratic conception of nature as
ordered for man's use in his Politics. Here, Aristotle
expresses the idea of purpose in nature, including the
relation of plants and animals to the need of man.
According to Aristotle:
In like manner we may infer that, after the 
birth of animals, plants exist for their sake, 
and that the other animals exist for the sake 
of man, the tame for use and food, the wild, if 
not all, at least the greater part of them, for 
food, and for the provision of clothing and 
various instruments. Now if nature makes 
nothing incomplete, and nothing in vain, the
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inference must be made that she has made all 
animals and plants for the sake of man 
(Aristotle 1920, 40).
In this anthropocentric conception of interrelationships in
nature, the distribution of plants and animals is directly
related to the needs and uses of man (Glacken, 48).
Aristotle's notion of the material world's subservience to
humankind is amplified by his acceptance of the Platonic
division of the soul from the material. Spirit or soul not
only existed apart from the body, but was superior to
earthly materials and the body.
The fusion of Greek rationalism with Judaic and early
Christian thought provided the genesis of the idea of
wilderness that has come to rule Western civilization for
the past two millennia. According to Oelschlaeger:
Christianity culminates earlier Mediterranean 
[e.g. Jewish, Greek, Roman] ideas of the earth 
as designed for human kind and is therefore the 
conceptual apotheosis of the Neolithic 
revolution. This assertion underscore the idea 
that the roots of environmental crises are 
buried far deeper than we usually think.
Indeed, we are compelled to recognize that 
Christianity is no one thing but a combination 
of historical determinants, including human 
nature and the agricultural revolution, which 
together introduced a historically 
unprecedented direction to human relations with 
wild nature: the natural world came to be
conceived as valueless until humanized 
(Oelschlaeger, 62).
With the Socratic-Platonic doctrine of the soul incorporated
into Christianity, Western civilization was set inexorably
on an anthropocentric course. In this framework, humanity
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remained at the center of all things, and Western culture 
and society became alienated from the natural world. Judeo- 
Christian faith claimed nothing from nature, for God alone 
was important, and human attention shifted from the 
intuitive, mystical, and physical to the supranatural and 
transcendental (Oelschlaeger, 65).
Early Christian thinkers readily accepted this 
worldview that desacrilized nature and placed humankind 
above nature without hesitation. What was important to 
these thinkers was humankind's relationship with God and not 
with the physical world which surrounded it. The work of 
Thomas Aquinas provides an example of the Greco/Judeo- 
Christian synthesis. In his Summa Theoloqica. Aquinas 
writes:
For his disobedience to God, man was punished 
by the disobedience of those creatures which 
should be subject to him...Now all animals are 
naturally subject to man. This can be proved 
in three ways. First, from the order observed 
by nature; for just as in the generation of 
things we perceive a certain order of 
procession of the perfect from the 
imperfect... so also is there order in the use 
of natural things; thus the imperfect are for 
the use of the perfect; as the plants make use 
of the earth for their nourishment, and animals 
make use of plants, and man makes use of both 
plants and animals. Therefore it is in keeping 
with the order of nature, that man should be 
master over animals....Secondly, this is proved 
from the order of Divine Providence which 
always governs inferior things by the superior.
Wherefore, as man, being made in the image of 
God, is above other animals, these are rightly 
subject to his government. Thirdly, this is 
proved from a property of man and of other 
animals. for we seen in the latter a certain 
participated prudence of natural instinct, in
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regard to certain particular acts; whereas man 
possesses a universal prudence as regards all 
practical matters. Now whatever is
participated is subject to what is essential 
and universal. Therefore the subjection of 
other animals to man is proved to be natural 
(Aquinas 1913, 327).
Aquinas placed humans at the top of creation, arguing that
humans had been created in the image of their maker and
endowed with reason. Reason, in turn, gave man domain over
all other nature.
Modernism and Wilderness
A discussion of wilderness and American traditions
toward wilderness would be incomplete without discussing the
impact of the paradigmatic shift to Modernism. Modernism
refers to the historical movement beginning with the
Renaissance, and continuing through the present, in which
the peoples of Western Europe utilized those Western
traditions discussed above with science and technology in an
attempt to transform wilderness into industrialized
civilizations in an attempt to secure liberty and
prosperity. According to William Connolly:
In modernity, the insistence upon taking charge 
of the world comes into its own. Nature 
becomes a set of laws susceptible to human 
knowledge, a deposit of resources for potential 
use... While [this] orientation jostles 
with...others for priority, [it does] place 
nature at the disposal of humanity. Human and 
non-human nature become material to work on.
The world loses its earlier property as a text 
upon which the will of God is inscribed and 
through which humans can come to a more
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profound understanding of their proper place in 
the order of things (Connolly 1988, 2).
Modernism, as a paradigm, therefore consists of a set of
perceptions regarding science, rationality, and nature that
have been established over a long period of time and
continues to reinforce humankind's ongoing attempts to
dominate nature in the pursuit of Modernism's aims.
Modernism is comprised of a number of historical 
elements that were intertwined and interrelated in a complex 
manner. Among these processes were the Renaissance, the 
Reformation, the Enlightenment, and the democratic, 
industrial, and scientific revolutions. Each tended to 
reinforce the other as seen in the case of industrial 
technology and capitalism. The point here is not to 
determine causation, but rather to explore the 
interrelatedness of these historical, societal, and 
political phenomena.
The key to understanding this era of the Western 
experience is that these social, political, and historical 
forces together challenged the power of the Catholic Church, 
elevated reason over faith, and legitimated the pursuit of 
worldly gain. The industrial revolution, with its rising 
material demands placed upon wilderness and reinforced in 
its later phases by scientific technology, provided a means 
to satisfy the economic aspirations of market oriented,
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capitalistic societies. Modernism also effected an 
ideological conversion of the wilderness into material 
nature, both as an object of scientific inquiry and as the 
means to fuel economic progress. Modernism thus 
institutionalized a profound homocentrism, still dominant in 
the world, which may be characterized by a radical change in
humankind's sense of its own relative significance. "Unlike
Paleolithic and Neolithic people, and unlike the Greeks and 
early Christians," writes Oelschlaeger, "modern human beings 
think of themselves as existing without natural limits" 
(Oelschlaeger, 69).
One of Modernism's most important contributions to the
Western traditional view of wilderness is the scientific
perspective. According to Merchant:
Since the scientific revolution of the 
seventeenth century, the West has seen nature 
primarily through the spectacles of mechanistic 
science. Matter is dead and inert, remaining 
at rest or moving with uniform velocity in a 
straight line unless acted upon by external 
forces. Change comes from outside as in the 
operation of a machine. The world itself is a 
clock, adjustable by human clock-makers.
Nature is passive and manipulable 
(Merchant, 7).
Those thinkers who figured predominantly in providing 
the foundation of the scientific revolution were Galileo, 
Francis Bacon, Rene Descartes, and Isaac Newton. Considered 
together, these thinkers represented a paradigm shift so 
radical that the very meaning of the word of nature, and
30
wilderness's place in it, changed. "This conceptual
change," according to Oelschlaeger:
reflected in such twentieth-century usages as 
'wild nature' as distinct from 'nature' 
simpliciter. Nature is now believed to be the 
object of scientific study, and nothing remains 
in it of anything as identifiably 
wilderness...the idea of nature as animate and 
living, where species seek to realize their 
natural ends, has been displace by the idea of 
a cold and lifeless mechanical nature. In 
explanatory terms, the Aristotelian syllogism 
has been replaced by the causal explanation; 
thus, natural motions were understood no longer 
as the consequence of biological entelechy but 
rather as the consequence of external forces 
acting upon a body. As Newton argued, 
summarizing the modernist view of motion, every 
action is the consequence of some other distant 
action. The modern mind has come to view 
nature as nothing more than matter-in-motion, 
whether planets, projectiles, or even animals 
(Oelschlaeger, 77).
The mechanical worldview offered a strategy wherein the
empirical investigation of nature could proceed unimpeded by
the church. God was interpreted as the clock-maker, the
universe as his clock, and science merely as a means to
disclose the underlying patterns of the mechanism.
Galileo led the way for the scientific age through his 
conceptualization of the world as explicitly apart from the 
world of concrete experience. For Galileo the size and 
shape of a physical body were real or objective —  that is, 
attributes of a physical world presumed to exist 
independently of human cognition (Oelschlaeger, 78). Real 
qualities become those that can be measured and subjected to 
arithmetical manipulation. The ideological offshoot of
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Modernism, scientism, views nature as an objective, 
mechanical process and denies validity to either 
nonreductionist or intuitive modes of consciousness as 
legitimate avenues of knowledge and understanding.
Moveover, Galileo's proposal of the use of induction, 
deduction, observation, and especially mathematics helped to 
undermine Medieval worldviews. Mathematical analysis 
provided the revolution with its essential rigor of 
scientific inquiry (Coppleston 1953, 20).
Francis Bacon represents the feeling of optimism in
man's capabilities over nature that was growing throughout
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Glacken, 471).
Bacon is seen as having formulated the concept of human
mastery over nature much more clearly than had been done
previously and to assign it a prominent place among
humankind's concerns. According to William Leiss:
[The domination of nature] was wedded once 
again to the predominant cultural force of that 
time, namely, Christianity. The idea was made 
'respectable.' Of course the notion of man's 
dominion over the earth had always been a part 
of the Judeo-Christian heritage...but in the 
context of the emerging constellation of 
historical factors at that time —  the 
economic, social, political, scientific, and 
technological changes which capitalism fused 
together into a system of expanding 
productivity —  this notion took on a whole new 
significance. The precise way in which Bacon 
reformulated it was crucial, for Christianity's 
hold on the European consciousness remained 
strong even as the traditional social basis of 
organized religion was being eroded away by 
capitalism (Leiss 1972, 49).
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In Bacon's view religion and science were both instrumental 
in an effort to reclaim that which had been lost with the 
expulsion of humankind from Eden. So expressed, Bacon 
provided the formula whereby the idea of the mastery over 
nature became widely acceptable. Through the use of 
science, humans could rescue themselves from the fall from 
Paradise by the economic development and exploitation of 
nature in building the "New Jerusalem."
Rene Descartes defined for the scientific revolution 
and Modernism the idea of nature itself. Descartes proposed 
that the mind is distinct from the matter it might perceive 
and that the natural world is a machine that can be broken 
down into its component parts for analysis. Like Bacon, 
Descartes believed in the power of natural reason and that 
such power could transform and modify nature itself. 
Descartes most profound contribution may be seen in his 
conceiving of the material world as a complex mechanism and 
his insistence that an absolute understanding of that world 
is possible. Animals are considered mere machines, 
incapable of feelings such as pain, and like machines, they 
have use value only. Descartes, along with Bacon, believed 
that man might redeem himself from the fall by creation of a 
heaven on earth through the use of science.
Isaac Newton represents a clear transition from the 
Medieval to modernity by bringing the intellectual ferment 
of the scientific revolution to its theoretical culmination
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(Oelschlaeger, 89). Newton's physics was a culmination of 
the long-held desire for a logical and absolute 
understanding of the universe. Through mathematics Newton's 
mechanics elucidate the world experience as mathematical 
repetitions, rendering it in a previously unperceived 
manner. With Newtonian physics came the potential to remake 
the world according to humankind's designs and imagination 
and in doing so, brought the promise that humankind could 
free itself of its earthly misery.
The culmination of the scientific revolution of 
Modernism manifested itself in the period known as the 
Enlightenment. During this period, a number of diverse 
intellectual elements and historical forces were synthesized 
into the powerful paradigm of Modernism and centered around 
the industrial revolution. Of the thinkers of the time,
Adam Smith and his theories remain perhaps the most 
revealing of the period.
Smith's work, The Wealth of Nations, is the result of
his recognizing and synthesizing the various components of
Modernism into a comprehensive paradigm. Through the use of
observation and reason, Smith recognized that the different
components of culture, technology, politics, and society all
interrelate in the production of economies. There is in his
work the normative dimension of consumption as a condition
for human happiness. According to Oelschlaeger:
Like Bacon, [Smith] envisioned a 'mundus 
alter,' a world where the engine of economic
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growth drove society relentlessly forward in a 
ceaseless expansion of production-consuxnption 
cycle...Unlimited growth was the ethical 
justification for capitalism, and the reason 
why Smith believed it preferable to all other 
forms of human economy (Oelschlaeger, 92).
Man's salvation, for Smith, lay in the industrial revolution
and it is this presupposition that the Enlightenment's
attitude towards wilderness and wild nature is manifest.
That which has value for man, in the world view of
Modernism, is cultured and stripped of any of its wild
attributes.
The mechanistic philosophy developed by the natural 
philosophers discussed above legitimated the capitalist 
revolution and its domination of nature. According to 
Merchant:
Mechanical metaphors and the rhetoric of 
Manifest Destiny became core concepts of a 
modern philosophy that saw the world as a vast 
machine that could be mathematically described, 
predicted, and controlled...[Science 
constructed] a context free, value free 
knowledge of the external world. As
constructed by the seventeenth- century 
'fathers' of modern science, the mechanistic 
model served to legitimate the human 
prediction, control, and manipulation of nature 
(Merchant, 199).
As the eighteenth century gave way to the nineteenth, the
forces of history —  the scientific, democratic, and
industrial revolutions, the Enlightenment —  amalgamated
themselves into a cultural paradigm so powerful and
persuasive that it still rules Western society and its
institutions.
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The Western worldview toward wilderness and nature has 
a long and complex history. Although Greek tradition saw 
nature as animated and self-moving, it separated the human 
soul from the material. Judeo-Christian views strengthened 
the concept of separation and placed humans in a superior 
position to the nature they inhabited. Nature was becoming 
merely a material resource for the earth's rational 
creature. With the advent of the scientific revolution came 
the perception of the world and universe as vast machines 
that could be simply understood if broken down into their 
component parts. Capitalism and democracy coalesced with 
machine technology to effect the conversion of nature into 
simple components in an economic formula, devoid of any 
intrinsic value, possessing market value only. Modernism 
completes the intellectual divorce of humankind from nature 
and defines nature and wilderness in terms of man's designs 
upon it. It is this "modern" tradition that the Europeans 
brought with them to the New World that helped to define the 
foundations of its dominant social paradigm.
CHAPTER 3 
MODERNISM AND ITS CRITICS
Introduction
With the arrival of Western Europeans in the Americas 
and their subsequent settlement, the European worldview as 
developed by Modernism spread westward across the Atlantic. 
This chapter discusses the impact of Modernism upon the 
development of the traditional American attitude towards 
wilderness, traces the beginnings of the literary, 
philosophic, and scientific developments of the 
preservationist and conservationist views toward wilderness, 
and explores the evolution of the tension between Modernism 
and its critics.
Traditional American Views Toward Wilderness 
Alexis de Tocqueville provides in his classic work, 
Democracy in America. an excellent introduction to the early 
American sentiment towards wilderness. De Tocqueville notes 
that:
in Europe people talk a great deal of the wilds 
of America, but the Americans themselves never 
think about them; the are insensible to the 
wonders of inanimate nature and they may be 
said not to perceive the mighty forests that 
surround them till they fall beneath the
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hatchet. Their eyes are fixed upon another 
sight...the...march across the wilds, draining 
swamps, turning the course of rivers, peopling 
solitudes, and subduing nature 
(de Tocqueville 1945, 47) .
The attitude toward wilderness manifested itself on many
other American frontiers. William Bradford, upon his
arrival in the Massachusetts Bay Colony, viewed it as a
"hideous and desolate wilderness." Two centuries later fur-
trapper Alexander Ross, upon his arrival to the Columbia
River basin, recorded his despair in encountering a "gloomy,
dreary, and unhallowed wilderness" (Nash, 24). Wilderness
for wilderness' sake was never perceived as a value for the
American pioneer.
There were basically two components to the American 
pioneers' bias against wilderness that came to dominate 
traditional American views toward wilderness. The first of 
these was simply the physical threat to the pioneers' 
survival. "Safety and comfort," according to Nash, "even 
necessities like food and shelter, depended on overcoming 
the wild environment...[t]he pioneer... lived too close to 
wilderness for appreciation" (Nash, 24). The second 
component to the bias against wilderness, and more germane 
to this discussion, was the continuation of the Western 
tradition of viewing nature's wildness as being the earthly 
manifestation of Satan's power in a chaotic wasteland. The 
transformation of a wilderness from this chaos through the 
use and design of science into civilization was the reward
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for humankind's sacrifices. Humans, through the use of 
reason and science could perfect an incomplete and unordered 
natural world and free themselves from the misery of their 
earthly existence. Western expansion of civilization was 
perceived as good in an age which idealized progress and 
used civilization as measure of that progress. In the 
vocabulary of material progress and the paradigm of 
Modernism, wilderness had meaning only as an obstacle 
(Nash, 41).
Counterreaction to Modernism 
Modernism, as with all paradigms, was not without its 
challengers. However, as Oelschlaeger notes, there was not, 
nor is there now, one dominant alternative counter-paradigm 
to Modernism. Instead there were at least three 
identifiable currents of criticism of Modernism and perhaps 
one of the reasons Modernism still flourishes today: 
literary, philosophical, and scientific counterreactions. 
Each had important consequences upon American attitudes 
toward wilderness. The following discussion describes these 
various reactions to the dominant paradigm of Modernism.
Scientific Counterreactions 
The early scientific counter to Modernism was grounded 
in an attempt to recast traditional religious beliefs in a 
manner consistent with the advancing front of science and
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reason. These counterreactions in science to Modernist 
trends blended science with religion and philosophy. As 
Glacken points out, each of these was concerned with 
fundamental questions such as the proofs of God's existence, 
what were perceived as final causes in nature, and the 
orderliness of nature or "teleology" (Glacken, 505). This 
early scientific counter was made up of individuals who 
utilized scientific knowledge in an attempt to gain 
scientific certainty for traditional Judeo-Christian 
beliefs, such as a divine creator. Scientific evidence 
according to these scientists pointed to rational, reasoned 
God as the final cause for all natural phenomena. In spite 
of these arguments for design in nature, positive science, 
which argued for efficient rather than final cause and 
viewed nature as a mechanism or machine, proved to be more 
tenable than the uneasy alliance between science, religion 
and philosophy. The initial scientific counterreaction, 
however was not without importance. As discussed later, the 
scientific counterreaction helped set the stage for the work 
of Charles Darwin, who would in turn shatter many of 
Modernism's long held scientific beliefs.
Literary Counterreactions 
The literary alternative took shape in the form of the 
early Romantic writers who valued an immediate, personal, 
and affective relationship with nature and, like their
physico-theologist counterparts in the scientific
counteraction, were defenders of the Christian faith
According to Oelschlaeger:
To the Romantics nature was not a lifeless 
machine, mere matter in motion, but a living 
organism created by divine providence; they 
believed that God's presence was revealed 
through an aesthetic awareness of nature's 
beauty...The poetic view of nature gravitated 
toward wild and mysterious aspects, the felt 
qualitative rather than measured quantitative 
dimensions of experience (Oelschlaeger, 99).
The Romantic "Lake Poets", Lord Byron, Percy Shelley, and
Wordsworth, all perceived the society created by Modernism
and its search for material gain as inherently detrimental
to the individual and his freedom. Romantics believed
humans were more than simple components or inputs in a
mechanistic, morally bankrupt, and valueless society.
Nash sees the Romantic appreciation of wilderness as 
beginning in the cities where, free from the pressures of a 
frontier living, the literary elite began to feel the first 
resistance against the traditional Western response as 
conditioned by the dominant paradigm. The change in 
attitude began in the change in European worldviews with the 
advent of the scientific and industrial revolutions. For 
Nash:
Romanticism resists definition, but in general 
it implies an enthusiasm for the strange, 
remote, solitary, and mysterious. Consequently 
in regard to nature Romantics preferred the 
wild...Wilderness appealed to those bored or 
with man his weurku, it not only an escape from society Put also was an
ideal stage for the Romantic individual to
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in God.
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exercise the cult that he frequently made of 
his own soul. The solitude and total freedom 
of the wilderness created a perfect setting for 
either melancholy or exultation (Nash, 47).
In Europe, Jean-Jacques Rousseau articulated this seminal
appreciation for the wilderness condition.
Although his argument was not a call for humans to run
naked back into the woods, Rousseau, in his work Emile, does
argue for a blending of the primitive and wild qualities of
nature in the distorted "civilized life" of Western Europe
(Nash, 49). According to Rousseau:
Everything is good as it comes from the hands 
of the Author of Nature; but everything 
degenerates in the hands of man...He mingles 
and confounds the climates, the elements, the 
seasons; he overturns everything, disfigures 
everything; he loves deformity, monsters; he 
will have nothing as Nature made it, not even 
man (Rousseau 1906, 1) .
"Nature," in this case, consists of the material and
physical world unmodified by human design, but remains as an
intelligent and infallible guide for human endeavors. In
Rousseau's view:
We are born sensible, and from our birth we are 
affected in different ways by the objects which 
surround us. As soon as we have consciousness, 
so to speak, of our sensations, we are disposed 
to seek or to shun the objects which produce 
them: first according as they are agreeable or
disagreeable to us; then, according to the 
congruity or the incongruity which we find 
between ourselves and these objects; and, 
finally, according to the judgments which we 
derive from them relative to the idea of 
happiness or perfection which is given us by 
the reason. These dispositions are extended 
and strengthened in proportion as we become 
more susceptible and enlightened; but,
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constrained by our habits, they change more or 
less with our opinions. Before this
alteration, these dispositions are what I call 
our nature. It is, then, to these primitive 
dispositions that everything should be referred 
(Rousseau, 4).
With the publication of Emile. Rousseau sought to divest 
society of its artificial and absurd forms through a return 
toward primitive simplicity.
For Rousseau, society, its state, science, paradigms, 
all culture, represented an oppressive force that was 
suffocating and debasing the human spirit. What was needed 
for was a return to the natural state where culture and 
happiness are inversely related. In contrast to Hobbes, 
Bacon, Locke, and Smith, Rousseau found virtue in a life led 
closer to nature and its wilderness. Leaving humans in 
their natural condition, according to Rousseau, was not a 
necessary evil. It was the chains wrought by civilization 
that placed man in opposition to one another.
Also found within the Romantic counterreaction to 
Modernism is an intuitive, aesthetic reaction against 
mechanistic materialism. Nature for the Romantics could not 
be perceived as a machine, broken down simply into its 
constituent parts. The science of the scientific and 
industrial revolutions, in removing the observer from the 
observed, also removed the observer from experience of 
tangible sensations. Scientific nature was stripped of 
taste, sight, sound, and feeling to be left only with
quantifiable properties of mass, velocity, and repetition of 
invariant patterns. The Romantic aim was to end the use of 
the abstract language of science and encourage the use of a 
poetic nature that was considered alive, subjective, and the 
source of aesthetic delight and philosophical inspiration. 
The Romantic movement can be understood, then, as a reaction 
that purposely took an aesthetic approach. Unlike the 
strictly philosophical reaction to Modernism, where such 
thinkers as Spinoza and Schopenhauer systematically worked 
through conceptual (epistomological, metaphysical, and 
ethical) issues, the Romantics were concerned with affective 
immediacy: they followed a direct intuitive route to a
realization of the unity of nature, a route which was to 
have important implications in the development of American 
attitudes towards wilderness in the mid-to-late nineteenth 
century (Oelschlaeger, 113).
The Romantic movement sought to investigate and 
discover man's relationship with nature and his place in it. 
For example, Immanuel Kant provided insight to humankind's 
relation with nature that espoused Romantic leanings. In 
Kant's earlier works, such as the Critique of Pure Reason, 
the world is given over to the dominant paradigm of the time 
and consigned to be viewed as a mechanism. Humankind, Kant 
argued, had achieved through physics a certain knowledge of 
the phenomenal world that would be good for all people in 
all places and times. The rational mind, according to Kant,
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could, therefore, perceive the world in the modern, 
scientific perspectives provided by Newtonian physics.
In his later writing, however, and especially in his 
Critique of Judgment, it is clear that Kant attempted to 
reconcile the mechanistic with the intuitive and aesthetic 
constructs of human consciousness. In the Critique of 
Judgment, Kant points out the inadequacies of reasoned 
analogies which likened nature to a machine. According to 
Kant:
In a watch one part is the instrument by which 
the movement of the others is effected, but one 
wheel is not the efficient cause of the 
production of the other. One part is certainly 
present for the sake of the other, but it does 
not owe its presence to the agency of that 
other...hence [a watch] does not itself replace 
its parts of which it has been deprived 
of... nor does it repair its own casual 
disorders. But these are all things which we 
are justified in expecting from organized 
nature. An organized being is, therefore, not 
a mere machine. For a machine has solely 
motive power, whereas an organized being 
possesses inherent formative power, and such, 
moreover, as it can impart to material devoid 
of it —  material which it organizes. This, 
therefore, is a self-propagating formative 
power, which cannot be explained by the 
capacity of movement alone, that is to say, by 
mechanism (Kant 1961, 22).
Kant's move away from the conception of nature as 
mechanism in the Critique of Judgment is ultimately a 
legitimation of a poetic nature. Kant maintained the 
autonomy of aesthetic judgment from the rational in the 
human mind and in doing so suggests that there exists an 
independent realm of the aesthetic which is quite unique
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from other realms of morality and of nature
(Megill 1985, 12). This defense of the aesthetic Kant based 
upon "the indeterminate idea of the supersensible within us" 
—  intuition (Kant, 208). While defending the aesthetic as 
a legitimate form of cognition, separate and equal to pure 
reason, Kant defended implicitly the use of intuition as a 
conceptual framework. As a result of Kant's work, nature no 
longer needed to be viewed only in rational, mechanical 
light. Aesthetic, spiritual, and intuitive constructs of 
nature gained legitimacy.
Philosophical Counterreactions 
The foremost philosophical critic of Modernism was the 
Dutch-Jewish philosopher, Benedict Spinoza. Classical 
science, Spinoza argues, prevents the possibility of humans 
recognizing their relationship between themselves and 
nature. Since humankind was bound within the constructs of 
nature, humankind's happiness depends upon its ability to 
recognize this relationship. Spinoza accepted science's 
framework of inquiry as a legitimate, comprehensive mode of 
inquiry, but questioned its failure to consider the relation 
between humans as agents in the world and nature itself. He 
therefore sought to devise an ethical framework for 
humankind grounded in nature which would supersede any 
disruptions resulting from scientific knowledge and 
technology. In effect, what classical science had denied —
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the relation between humans as ethical agents and nature as 
the environment in which they acted —  Spinoza hoped to 
restore (Oelschlaeger, 122).
Spinoza based his ethics on the principle of the unity 
of nature. Indeed, much of the work preceding and including 
his Ethics was dedicated to the purpose of reducing the 
universe to a unified and uniformed whole governed by 
universal and unchangeable laws. According to Harry 
Wolfson:
That philosophers before him had fallen short 
of the attainment of this purpose —  that they 
had broken up the universe into discontinuous 
parts by positing a spiritual God as distinct 
from the material world, and correspondingly in 
man a spiritual soul as distinct from a 
material body, with the resulting beliefs of 
design in nature and free will in man —  was in 
his opinion due to a logical inconsistency in 
their thinking (Wolfson 1948, 33).
In separating both God and man from the physical and
material, these philosophers, Spinoza argued, could not
logically achieve a unified universe. According to Spinoza,
one substance cannot be produced by another substance
(Spinoza 1933, 41). His corollary to this proposition,
then, is that there is nothing can be produced by anything
external to itself: something cannot come from nothing.
The main-point then of his corollary is that if the material
world were produced by an immaterial God, something would be
produced from nothing. Rather than trying to work within
this conception of God nature, Spinoza proposed both God and
humankind be placed under and within, not outside and above,
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the universal rule of nature and thus establishing its unity 
(Wolfson, 332).
Early American Counterreactions
Much of the reaction to the Modernist paradigm found 
its way into American thought and letters of the early and 
mid-nineteenth century. In doing so, these critics helped 
in the development of the early elements of wilderness 
appreciation. In America, as in Europe, appreciation for 
wilderness was based upon Romanticism and its use of the 
sublime (the association of God with wild nature). This 
appreciation found its way into the thought of those members 
of American society who were usually not involved directly 
with wilderness as was the pioneer —  urban elites.
According to Nash, William Byrd II of Virginia is one 
of the earliest American Romantics. Educated in London,
Byrd returned to his family plantation in Virginia but never 
lost interest in English social and literary trends, 
including the Romantic counterreaction to the Modernist 
paradigm. While working as a commissioner in a surveying 
operation to establish Virginia's boundary with North 
Carolina, Byrd began to collect his thoughts about the 
Virginia wilderness and published them in his book, History 
of the Dividing Line. While this work can hardly be called 
revolutionary, it does offer the first extensive American
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commentary putting wilderness in a more favorable light as
seen in the following passage:
Our landlord had a tolerable good house and 
clean furniture, and yet we could not be 
tempted to lodge in it. We chose rather to lie 
in the open field, for fear of growing too 
tender. A clear 'sky, spangled with stars, was 
our canopy, which being the last thing we say 
before we fell asleep gave us magnificent 
dreams. The truth of it is, we took so much 
pleasure in that natural kind of lodging, that 
I think at the foot of the account of mankind 
are great losers by the luxury of feather-beds 
and warm apartments. The curiosity of 
beholding so new and withal so sweet a method 
of encamping, brought one of the senators of N.
Carolina to make us a...visit (Byrd 1929, 58).
Byrd portrayed the expedition into "this great Wilderness"
as a delightful adventure. It is important to note,
however, that this nascent Romantic appreciation, the
beginnings of American appreciation of wilderness, and much
of the tradition that was to develop out of this small
movement, was seldom ever without qualification. Byrd, as
with many of those who supported his views, idealized most
often the economically useful, pastoral, and controlled
experience of nature (Nash, 53).
A particular theme of the American Romantic movement 
was the sense of freedom that vast expanses of wilderness 
offered. In his volume The Adirondack: or Life in the
Woods. Joel Headley at first expressed the typical Romantic 
reaction of awe, terror, sublimity, and beauty when 
confronted with the Adirondacks range. Headley went on to 
assert that he loved "the freedom of the wilderness and the
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absence of conventional forms there" (Nash, 62). Santa Fe
trader Josiah Gregg, following his final trip to the
Southwest in 1839, wrote:
I have striven in vain to reconcile myself to 
the even tenor of civilized life in the United 
States; and have sought in its amusements and 
its society a substitute for those high 
excitements which have attached me so strongly 
to Prairie life. Yet I am almost ashamed to 
confess that scarcely a day passes without my 
experiencing a pang of regret I am not now 
roving at large upon those western plains. Nor 
do I find my taste peculiar; for I have hardly 
known a man, who has ever become familiar with 
the kind of life which I have led for so many 
years, that has not relinquished it with 
regret...The wild, unsettled and independent 
life of the Prairie trader, makes perfect 
freedom from nearly every kind of social 
dependence an absolute necessity of being...The 
exchange of this untrammelled condition —  this 
sovereign independence, for a life in 
civilization, where both [humankind's] physical 
and moral freedom are invaded at every turn, by 
the complicated machinery of social 
institutions, is certainly to commend itself to 
but few, —  not even to all those who have been 
educated to find their enjoyments in the arts 
and elegancies peculiar to civilized society; - 
- as is evinced by the frequent instances of 
men of letters, of refinement and of wealth, 
voluntarily abandoning society for a life upon 
the Prairies, or in the still more savage 
mountain wilds (Gregg 1966, 219).
However, Romantics feared leaving civilization totally 
behind. Rather, they preferred to keep a foot in each 
realm, taking advantage of the virtues offered by each.
While appreciation of wilderness existed, it was rarely, if 
ever, wholly unqualified. Romanticism had cleared enough of 
the old assumptions away to permit a more or less favorable 
attitude toward wilderness without entirely eliminating the
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instinctive fear and hostility a wilderness condition had 
produced.
In summary, the roots of traditional American 
attitudes concerning wilderness were conditioned by the 
paradigm of Modernism. With the arrival of Europeans upon 
the shores of the New World, so too came their world view 
and the initial reaction to the wilderness in which they 
found themselves. Traditional notions of progress, 
development, domination, and the conception of nature as a 
mechanism all helped in the development of the dominant 
paradigm in American society and its subsequent treatment of 
wilderness. However, as the European scientific, 
philosophical, and literary counterreactions to Modernism 
spread throughout the Continent, they also found 
articulation in the New World in the form of the American 
Romantic movement. The seeds of discontent were sown in the 
fertile ground of urban elites whose experience with 
wilderness was more limited than that of their pioneer 
counterparts. From this seminal Romantic countermovement 
rose America's first true philosophic movement, 
Transcendentalism, and one of the most important voices in 
the development of Romantic appreciation of wilderness in 
America —  Henry David Thoreau.
CHAPTER 4
THOREAU AND ROMANTIC WILDERNESS 
Introduction
The Romantic movement in America, reflecting the 
European counterreaction to the paradigm of Modernism, had 
profound implications for the American designs upon 
wilderness. This chapter discusses further the 
repercussions of the literary and philosophical reaction 
upon Transcendentalism and, in turn, its impact upon 
possibly the most pivotal figure in the development of the 
American wilderness appreciation —  Henry David Thoreau.
Transcendentalism
To understand the thought of Henry Thoreau it is
necessary to discuss first the American Transcendental
movement and the work of Ralph Waldo Emerson. In her work,
Transcendentalism as a Social Movement. Anne Rose notes that
much of the academic interest in the Transcendental movement
focuses upon its intellectual component. According to Rose:
Here the Transcendentalists helped demonstrate 
that America had a native intellectual and 
literary tradition, and the documents Perry 
Miller collected in The Transcendentalists 
(1950) are indeed convincing proof of the force 
and originality of their thinking
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...[there is a] strong case...made for the 
Transcendentalists as leading thinkers 
. . . [whose] heart and soul was the faith that 
the normal democratic process could be trusted 
to yield social justice...(Rose 1981, viii).
Transcendentalism was a religious, philosophical, and 
literary movement and located in the history of American 
religious thought as post-Unitarian and freethinking, as 
Kantian and idealistic in philosophy, and Romantic and 
individualistic in literature. The Transcendental 
counteraction began as a quest for new ways of conceiving 
the human condition to replace Modernist concepts that no 
longer elicited any conviction for many.
"Transcendentalism," according to Paul Boiler, "in short, 
was mainly an enterprise undertaken by bright young 
Unitarians to find meaning, pattern and purpose in a 
[modern] universe no longer managed by a genteel and amiable 
Unitarian God" (Boiler 1974, xx).
For those who participated in Transcendentalism, the 
experience was one of wonder and joy they found in the 
universe all around them. Transcendentalism meant breaking 
out of conditioned, habitualized ways of conceiving things 
and trying to view reality with what has been called the 
"innocent eye." "In the tradition of Idealist such as Plato 
and Kant," writes Nash, "the American Transcendentalists 
postulated the existence of a reality higher than the 
physical" (Nash, 85). There was for the Transcendentalists, 
as their name implies, a higher realm of spiritual truth and
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vitality that existed apart from the lower world of the 
material. According to Rose, "[the Transcendentalists] had 
hoped to save Christianity from historical oblivion and to 
give it personal immediacy by pointing out the identity of 
Gospel truth and intuition" (Rose, 38).
Ralph Waldo Emerson, recognized as the father of
American Transcendentalism, gave the best explanation of
what the word meant in his lecture "The Transcendentalist."
According to Emerson:
What is popularly called Transcendentalism 
among us, is Idealism; Idealism as it appears 
in 1842. As thinkers, mankind have ever 
divided into two sects, Materialists and 
Idealists...The materialist insists on facts, 
on history, on the force of circumstances, and 
the animal wants of man; the idealist on the 
power of Thought and of Will, on inspiration, 
on miracle, on individual culture. These two 
modes of thinking are both natural, but the 
idealist concedes that his way of thinking is 
in higher nature...it is well known to most of 
my audience that the Idealism of the present 
day acquired the name Transcendental from the 
term used by Immanuel Kant, of Konigsberg, who 
replied to the skeptical philosophy of Locke, 
which insisted that there was nothing in the 
intellect which was not previously in the 
experience of the senses, by showing that there 
was a very important class of ideas imperative 
forms, which did not come by experience, but 
through which experience was acquired; that 
these were intuitions of the mind itself; and 
he denominated them Transcendental forms. The 
extraordinary profoundness and precision of 
that man's thinking have given vogue to his 
nomenclature, in Europe and America, to that 
extent that whatever belongs to the class of 
intuitive thought popularly called at the 
present day 'Transcendental'
(Emerson 1983, 193).
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Kant was, in short, the wellspring of the American 
Transcendentalist movement. Kant believed that human 
reason, inevitably seeks to know what ultimate reality is; 
it tries to unify the concepts provided by the Understanding 
(transformation of concrete concepts into the abstract) in 
order to produce metaphysical or religious ideas that will 
explain the universe as a whole in its fundamental character 
(Boiler, 39).
Kant's influence upon Transcendentalist thinkers
resulted in their placing faith in intuition and not the
pure reason of Modernism. This faith in intuition can be
seen in the Transcendentalist faith in the natural-material
world. Through the use of intuition a natural object, if
rightly seen and construed, would reflect universal
spiritual truths. Nature was at least the mirroring of
higher laws that emanated from God, if not the actual
embodiment of God himself (Nash, 85). Boiler argues that
this in turn provided alternative moral and religious ideals
to the society of the age. According to Boiler:
The [Transcendentalists] were absolutely 
certain that these ideals were grounded in the 
very nature of things and that efforts to live 
by them made for more fruitful and authentic 
living than the mechanistic philosophy of the 
Lockeans (Boiler, 63).
From the Transcendentalist perspective, humankind 
finds itself rooted in the material world of a universe 
divided between object and essence. However, because of
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their possession of a soul or spirit, humans are able to
transcend their physical condition. According to Nash:
Using intuition or imagination (as distinct 
from rational understanding), man might 
penetrate to spiritual truths. In the same 
manner he could discover his own correspondence 
with the divine being and appreciate his 
capacity for moral improvement (Nash, 85).
In its perspective on humans and nature, 
Transcendentalism had profound implications for the meaning 
of the American wilderness. Transcendentalism, as a 
doctrine, placed God and the divine back into nature.
Nature was no longer merely the result of God's handiwork, 
but the actual vehicle through which humans could become 
aware of and in touch with the divine. In theory, 
Transcendentalists disabused themselves of the earlier ideas 
of wilderness as a wicked domain and regarded wilderness and 
its environment as a medium through which spiritual truths 
could be seen in a less inhibited manner. In his work, On 
Nature. what is commonly referred to as the 
Transcendentalist's manifesto, Emerson makes this point 
clear:
The stars awaken a certain reverence, because 
though always present, they are inaccessible; 
but all natural objects make a kindred 
impression, when the mind is open to their 
influence. Nature never wears a mean
appearance. Neither does the wisest man extort 
her secret, and lose his curiosity by finding 
out all her perfection. Nature never becomes a 
toy to a wise spirit. The flowers, the 
animals, the mountains, reflected the wisdom of 
his best hour, as much as they had delighted 
the simplicity of his childhood. When we speak 
of nature in this manner, we have a distinct
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but most poetical sense in mind. We mean the 
integrity of impression made by manifold 
natural objects. It is this which
distinguishes the stick of timber of the wood­
cutter, from the tree of the poet. In the 
wilderness, I find something more dear and 
connate that in the streets of villages... in 
the woods we return to reason and faith 
(Emerson, 9).
This discussion of Transcendentalism introduces the
thoughts and attitudes that helped shape the Thoreauvian
worldview. It would be a mistake, however, to assume
Thoreau to be a mere epigone of Emerson's thought. Emerson
and the other Transcendentalists unquestionably left their
mark on Thoreau, but Transcendentalism alone does not
provide an adequate framework for understanding Thoreau's
idea of wilderness. According to Oelschlaeger:
Setting out from his transcendental 
inclinations, Thoreau developed through 
ceaseless reflective effort a remarkable 
philosophical position revolving around the 
ideas of self, society, and wilderness and the 
interrelations among them...[Emerson's] key 
contribution was helping Thoreau to establish a 
belief that nature can be known through the 
immediate activity of inquiring consciousness 
(or, alternatively, an absolute separation 
between consciousness and nature does not 
exist). This transcendental axiom, or first 
principle, was at the heart of the Emersonian 
philosophical legacy. But comparison of 
Emerson's Nature and other relevant 
writings...with Thoreau's mature work 
underscores the differences in their use of the 
imagination. Unlike Emerson, Thoreau uses 
transcendentalism as a departure point, that 
is, as justifying the intuitive apprehension 
and active questioning of nature 
(Oelschlaeger, 134).
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This difference is crucial in understanding Thoreau's moving 
beyond a Transcendental perspective of nature and wilderness 
(Rose, xi).
For Emerson, consciousness is nothing more than a
vehicle to carry man toward a pre-existing conclusion.
Nature is not a philosophical inquiry but a literary
exercise designed to rest a pre-established belief in God on
rational, rather than scriptural, footing. For Emerson
then, the emphasis is placed upon the human spirit and its
relationship with God. According to James McIntosh:
Emerson urges his readers to study nature by 
living in it and learning to read God's 
uncorrupted revelation imprinted secretly on 
it. On the other hand, Emerson keeps saying 
that nature is insignificant in 
itself...'Nature is but an image or imitation 
of wisdom, the last thing of the soul; Nature 
being a thing which doth only do, but not 
know...' In general, the intention of
Emerson's book is not simply to urge a return 
to nature, but to show how to bring nature 
under the way of man's spirit, so that the 
universe may at last be entirely spiritual 
(McIntosh 1974, 30).
The conceptual focal point for Emerson was not nature or
wilderness —  they were mere tools in the effort to achieve
spirituality, not an end or good in themselves.
Henry David Thoreau and the Romantic Position 
A discussion of transcendentalism alone is not enough 
to understand the thought of Thoreau. "As with all first- 
rate minds," writes Oelschlaeger, "[Thoreau's] cannot be 
reduced to the ideas of his progenitors. Thoreau asks
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questions and finds interrelations between the human species 
and nature about which Emerson never dreamed”
(Oelschlaeger, 136). Rather than attempting to "build a 
kingdom of man over nature," Thoreau seeks a partnership of 
equals with it, where nature might foster the poetic in man 
and man in turn treats nature as a single, living, 
existential being (McIntosh, 34). It is Thoreau's 
attraction to nature and its wild attributes that set him 
apart from Emerson.
Emerson's ideas, however, led Thoreau to make a
extraordinary investment in the idea of nature. The
principle that humans may in fact correspond with or
discover themselves through a relationship with nature
"enabled [Thoreau] to think about all the natural life that
came into his ken, whether it was beautiful or ugly, wild or
tame, exhilarating or boring" (McIntosh, 37). At the same
time, however, Thoreau was strained to accept
transcendentalism wholeheartedly because of the ambiguities
that he felt it held toward nature. As a result, Thoreau
developed a double program —  to live intensely in the
spiritual and physical realms. According to McIntosh:
[These] two lives pull against each other in 
his work. The theory also make him acutely 
aware that he as a conscious seeker was 
separate from nature. And finally, the theory 
covertly instilled in him the doubt that nature 
exists, a doubt that consorted uneasily in his 
mind with his acute appreciation of nature's 
presence (McIntosh, 37).
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There are, therefore, contradictions in Thoreau's views 
toward nature. Thoreau's views regarding nature must be 
approached with the understanding that they are the result 
of a complex tension between the creative force of his 
intuition (that nature and man exist in symbiosis) and the 
rational force of his ideal logic, a logic that questions 
the benevolence and even the existence of nature.
There is a second factor shaping Thoreau's attitude 
towards wilderness —  his opinion of civilization. As Nash 
points out:
By mid-century American life had acquired a 
bustling tempo and materialistic tone that left 
Thoreau and many of his contemporaries vaguely 
disturbed and insecure. To be sure, the 
official faith in progress ran strong. Yet the 
idea that a technological civilization and the 
pursuit of progress was disrupting older, 
better patterns of living could not be entirely 
set aside (Nash, 87).
The development of Thoreau's wilderness philosophy must
therefore be considered more meaningful when juxtaposed
against this sense of discontent with society.
Thoreau's conception of the value of wilderness is a 
result of vigorous self examination and a lifetime of 
primary experiences with nature. Not only did he live for 
two years alongside Walden Pond, but he ranged widely around 
New England, Maine, and Canada. For Thoreau, the presence 
of wild nature was of utmost importance. Unlike many of his 
Romantic contemporaries, Thoreau was not satisfied in only 
articulating some appreciation for wilderness. Thoreau
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grounded his argument in the idea that wilderness was the 
source of vigor, inspiration, and strength for man's 
physical as well as spiritual well being. According to 
Thoreau:
Life consists with wildness. The most alive is 
the wildest. Not yet subdued by man, its 
presence refreshes him. One who is not pressed 
forth incessantly and never rested from his 
labors, who grew fast and made infinite demands 
on life, would always find himself in a new 
country or wilderness, and surrounded by the 
raw material of life (Thoreau 1977, 611).
Loss of contact with the wild, leaves humans, their culture
and society less than whole.
Thoreau's inclinations toward nature are recorded in
the Natural History of Massachusetts, considered to be one
of the first instances of his nature writing. In it, as
seen in the following passage, Thoreau diverged from
mainline Transcendentalists:
In society you will not find health, but in 
nature. Unless our feet at least stood in the 
midst of nature, all our races would be pale 
and livid. Society is always diseased, and the 
best is more so... The doctrines of despair, of 
spiritual or political tyranny or servitude, 
were never taught by such as shared the 
serenity of nature...We fancy that this din of 
religion, literature, and philosophy, which is 
heard in pulpits, lyceums, and parlors, 
vibrates through the universe, and is as 
catholic a sound as the creaking of the earth's 
axle; but if a man sleep soundly, he will 
forget it all between sunset and dawn 
(Thoreau 1977, 33).
Thoreau, with such writing, was not apt to make many friends
or wield much influence among New England's
Transcendentalists.
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With the writing of Natural History. Thoreau manifests
his predilection for the critical. No axiom or opinion was
left unturned. Thoreau*s iconoclasm led him to another
important critique: his criticism of the scientific method.
Not only did his critique question the very method through
which the Transcendentalists hoped to reveal the eternal
laws of nature, but question the Cartesian-Newtonian
paradigm itself. Thoreau writes in Natural History:
Wisdom does not inspect, but behold. We must 
look a long time before we can see. Slow are 
the beginnings of philosophy. He has something 
demoniacal in, who can discern a law or a 
couple of two facts...The true man of science 
will know nature better by his finer
organization; he will smell, taste, see, hear, 
feel, better than other men. His will be a 
deeper and finer experience. We do not learn 
by inference and deduction and the application 
of mathematics to philosophy, but by direct 
intercourse and sympathy. It is with science 
as with ethics, —  we cannot know truth by 
contrivance and method; the Baconian is as 
false as any other, an with all the helps of 
machinery and the arts, the most scientific
will still be the healthiest and friendliest
man, and possess a more perfect...wisdom
(Thoreau 1977, 56).
Natural History was Thoreau*s attempt to revive a more
primitive awareness of the natural world and to show that a
nonmediated or scientific encounter with wilderness provides
humans with the raw material to gain such awareness.
According to Oelschlaeger, this is a legacy of idealism and
Romanticism unrealized in Emerson's Nature.
For Thoreau then, wilderness provided a reservoir of 
the raw material needed for humankind to regain its
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primitive awareness. However, like Emerson's, Thoreau's
attention was upon the benefits of nature upon humans.
Nature is a tool for humankind to utilize in order to
maintain and develop its spirit. According to Thoreau:
The poet's, commonly, is not a logger's path, 
but woodman's. The logger and pioneer have 
preceded him, like John the Baptist; eaten the 
wild honey, it may be, but the locusts also; 
banished the decaying wood and the spongy 
mosses which feed on it, and built hearths and 
humanized Nature for him. But there are 
spirits of a yet more liberal culture, to whom 
no simplicity is barren. These are not only 
stately pines, but fragile flowers, like the 
orchises...which derive their nutriment from 
the crudest mass of peat. These remind us, 
that, not only for strength, but for beauty, 
the poet must, from time to time, travel the 
logger's path and the Indian's trail, to drink 
at some new and more bracing fountain of the 
Muses, far in the recesses of the wilderness 
(Thoreau 1985, 712).
Wilderness for Thoreau was essential to humans for it
symbolized the untapped potential in every individual.
Thoreau urged humans to explore the wild without, in an
effort to facilitate the exploration of the wild nature
within.
Thoreau, like Emerson, represents a transition.
Emerson and the Transcendentalists provided the necessary 
link between the counterreaction to Modernism occurring in 
Europe with the seminal American movement. Emerson invested 
Thoreau with a great appreciation of nature's ability to 
help humanity correspond with its true nature. Thoreau, in 
turn, sought to abandon the use of Modernism's paradigm.
Wild nature and the opportunity it provides for humans to
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explore their inner-self through the use of intuition rather 
than rationality remained a lasting theme for Thoreau and 
marks his departure from the Transcendentalist to a 
Thoreauvian world view. This view, however, was not wholly 
unqualified.
"While Thoreau was unprecedented in his praise of the
American wilderness," writes Nash, "his enthusiasm was not
undiluted; some of the old antipathy and fear lingered even
in his thought. Encountering the Maine woods underscored
it" (Nash, 90). His journey to the Maine wilderness,
especially his encounter with Mt. Ktaadn, thoroughly
convinced Thoreau that the Transcendentalist's notion of
nature and the world existing for human use was wrong. The
wilderness Maine presented the uninitiated Thoreau with a
view of the world that was vast, wild, and in Thoreau's
words, "grim." The landscape was "savage" and "dreary."
Where he once exalted in the solitude of the woods
surrounding Walden Pond, he found the woods of Maine
intolerably lonesome, as seen in the following passage:
It was vast, Titanic, and such as man never 
inhabits...inhuman Nature has got him at a 
disadvantage, caught him alone, and pilfers him 
of some of his divine faculty. She does not 
smile on him as in the plains.. .Nature was here 
something savage and awful, though 
beautiful...This was that Earth of which we 
have heard, made out of Chaos and Old 
Night...There was there felt the presence of a 
force not bound to be kind to man. It was a 
place for heathenism and superstitious rites, - 
- to be inhabited by men nearer of kin to the 
rocks and to wild animals than we 
(Thoreau 1985, 640).
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Ktaadn awakened Thoreau to what he perceived as nature's 
darker side. While Walden represents the positive in 
nature, Thoreau's writings regarding his Mt. Ktaadn 
experience reveal that nature is not without its negative 
aspects.
Thoreau's experience in Maine, however, is not without
its benefits either. According to Oelschlaeger:
Positively viewed, the position developed in 
'Ktaadn' is antithetical to Emerson's 
philosophy, the final step in Thoreau's 
development from [TJranscendentalism to a 
genuine relationship with the universe. His 
writings hereafter carry the mark of his 
singular experiences, of his unique vantage 
point on the wilderness, and of his genius.
More important, the encounter with Ktaadn 
sharpens Thoreau's understanding of the 
interrelations between humankind and 
nature...By the time he returned to Walden he 
was enroute to developing...a profound 
revolutionary perspective on nature 
(Oelschlaeger, 149).
Walden helps form the heart of Thoreau's wilderness 
philosophy, outlining both the critical —  his continuing 
critique of Modernism's paradigms and its conventional 
wisdom —  and the positive —  his recognition of the 
pervasive continuities between the human and the natural —  
sides of his thought (Oelschlaeger, 168). Thoreau's 
experience with Mt. Ktaadn presented him with the problem of 
having to rectify his sense of the separateness of humankind 
from nature and its love for nature. As Nash describes, how 
was it possible to secure the advantages of civilization 
without suffering from any of its disadvantages? For
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Thoreau the answer lay in an Aristotlean golden mean: the
vitality and introspection offered by wilderness balanced by 
the sensitivity and intellectual and moral growth that 
characterized his ideal view of civilization. The ideal 
person or society occupied a middling, or to use Nash's 
spectrum approach, a pastoral position, drawing on both the 
wild and the refined. The essential requirement for society 
was to maintain contact with both civilization and 
wilderness (Nash, 92).
Thoreau's impact American attitudes and ideas
regarding wilderness may be considered two-fold. First, in
providing a philosophic defense of wilderness, Thoreau gave
the American idealization of the pastoral a new foundation.
According to Nash:
Previously most Americans had revered the 
rural, agrarian condition as a release from 
both wilderness and from high civilization.
They stood, so to speak, with both feet in the 
center of the spectrum of environments.
Thoreau...arrived at the middle by straddling.
He rejoiced in the extremes and, by keeping a 
foot in <each, believed he could extract the 
best of both worlds...According to Thoreau, 
wildness and refinement were not fatal extremes 
but equally beneficent influences Americans 
would do well to blend (Nash, 94).
The second important aspect is Thoreau's identifying
the necessity of wild nature to maintain the vitality of the
human spirit.' This is best seen in his essay Walking where
Thoreau writes:
I wish to speak a word for Nature, for absolute 
freedom and wildness, as contrasted with a 
freedom and culture merely civil, —  to regard
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man as an inhabitant, or a part and parcel of 
nature, rather than a member of 
society... Nowadays almost all man's 
improvements, so called, as the building of 
houses and the cutting down of the forest and 
of all the large trees, simply deform the 
landscape, and make it more and more tame and 
cheap...what I have been preparing to say is, 
that in Wildness is the preservation of the 
World...From the forest and wilderness come the 
tonics and barks which brace mankind. The 
story of Romulus and Remus being suckled by a 
wolf is not a meaningless fable. The founders 
of every state which has risen to eminence have 
drawn their nourishment and vigor from a 
similar wild source...In short all good things 
are wild and free (Thoreau 1977, 592).
Thoreau's essential insight here is nourishment a communion
with nature can bestow upon the individual and society.
Wilderness provides the essential mechanism through which
the individual's and, in turn, society's spiritual health
and vitality is maintained. The loss of wilderness
threatens the loss of this mechanism and subsequently the
loss of a society's necessary spiritual health.
Thoreau's work represents a transition. His is a move 
away from Emerson's theorizing and abstract treatment of 
nature. Here Thoreau's genius lies not in a retreat from 
civilization but rather in an affirmation of the reality of 
an organic process and humankind's inextricable linkage.with 
this process. Thoreau demonstrates through his writings his 
affinity with the iconoclast and in doing so recognizes the 
limitations of Modernism's scientific worldview. According 
to Oelschlaeger:
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his intuitive grasp of the evolutionary 
character of the cosmos, and the intertwining 
of matter, life, and consciousness in the human 
animal, has been vindicated, first by Darwin 
and later by ethology, human ecology, cultural 
anthropology, and cultural geography
(Oelschlaeger, 171).
Thoreau's notions of man, civilization, and wilderness 
are important here in that they came to form the foundation 
of the Romantic arguments for wilderness preservation. 
Arguments for the protection of wilderness by Romantic 
"preservationists" centered upon the spiritual and aesthetic 
qualities that wilderness offered society. By their 
definition, these arguments stood in clear contrast to the 
materialistic/capitalistic claims upon wilderness brought 
forth by the modern, industrial interests of the time —  
interests that would come to be defended by the 
conservationist.
CHAPTER 5
THE SCIENTIFIC COUNTERREACTION 
Introduction
Previous chapters have identified the dominant social 
paradigm, its impact upon traditional American views towards 
wilderness, and the literary and philosophical elements of 
the counterreaction to Modernism. This chapter explores the 
scientific thought championed by Modernism, the scientific 
counterreactions, and the impact of this scientific 
counterreaction on the conservation movement.
The Roots of Modernism's Science 
"The eighteenth-century," writes Donald Worster, "the 
age of Reason, [as] it is often called, still astonishes us 
with its fertility of imagination" (Worster 1985, 2) Much 
of what modern society has become today can be traced 
directly to the thought and philosophies that evolved during 
this century. Much of the thinking that evolved from the 
eighteenth-century looked with envy toward what the natural 
sciences had achieved: theoretical elegance and precision
leading to prediction and causal control.
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To understand the scientific counterreaction to 
Modernism, the following discussion briefly surveys the 
essentials of the scientific paradigm that are included in 
the idea of Modernism. A discussion of these scientific 
essentials starts with a discussion of Classical Greek 
thought, especially that of Aristotle and his theory of 
matter and motion.
According to Aristotle, matter remained motionless or
in a state of rest unless acted upon. A stone that is
unhewn remains unhewn so far as the stone is concerned: it
does not hew itself, nor does a hewn stone build itself into
a house (Coppleston 1960, 312). How then does change occur
from Aristotle's point of view? In the modern mind, the
cause of change must be a previous change, and that, if the
universe were static, it would remain so. In an Aristotlean
understanding of motion, according to Bertrand Russell:
we must take account of what he says about 
causes. There are, according to him, four 
kinds of causes, which were called,
respectively, material, formal, efficient, and 
final. Let us take...the man who is making the 
statue. The material cause of the statue is
the marble, the forma 1 cause is the essence of
the statue to be produced, the efficient cause 
is the contact of the chisel with the marble, 
and the final cause is the end that the
sculptor has in view. In modern terminology, 
the word 'cause' would be confined to the 
efficient cause...[the] final cause...supplies 
a purpose for change, which is essentially an 
evolution towards the likeness of God (Russell 
1946, 191).
It is important simply to understand that for Aristotle,
change depended upon the notion of a "mover" (God) who
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provided the impetus for change (the efficient cause of 
first cause) and the purpose for that change (final cause). 
Each of these views of change would have profound impact 
upon later Western thought, particularly that of the 
Renaissance, the Enlightenment and the scientific 
revolution.
The scientific revolution inspired a veritable
explosion of knowledge; never had such a tool for production
of knowledge, such a method of inquiry, been loosed upon the
world (Oelschlaeger,■100). Renaissance scientists were
primarily concerned about knowledge for its own sake. "But
at the same time," observes Coppleston:
it was a characteristic of some Renaissance 
thinkers to emphasize the practical fruits of 
knowledge. The new scientific discoveries and 
the opening up of the new world naturally 
suggested a contrast between a knowledge of 
nature, gained by study of her laws and making 
possible a use of nature for man's benefit, and 
the older abstract discipline which seemed 
devoid of practical utility 
(Coppleston 1953, 21).
Ultimately the driving spirit of the Renaissance expressed a
shift of emphasis away from the other-worldly to the more
mundane and from man's dependence upon nature to his
creative control over it (Coppleston 1953, 250).
Galileo and Efficient Cause 
Control over nature began with the revolutionary shift 
from an organismic to a mechanistic paradigmatic view of 
nature. This revolution began with Galileo. Galileo
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represents the focal shift from the scientific observer 
within nature to the scientific observer without, and the 
shift from final causes to efficient causes. Reflecting the 
social and political attitudes prevalent during this time, 
Galileo's use of physics ultimately took God out of the 
primary scheme of the physical and scientific world. The 
study of final causes seemed devoid of practical utility; 
the study of efficient causes enable one to control nature 
and to extend man's dominion over nature 
(Coppleston 1953, 21).
Galileo's focus on efficient cause rather than final 
cause as the reason for motion and change may be seen in his 
thoughts concerning astronomy. Motion, for Galileo, was not 
a result of God's desire and action to cause planets to move 
constantly, rather, it was inertial movement in the bodies 
themselves. God, in Galileo's model, put everything into 
motion once, and the rest is taken care of by the inertial 
movement of matter itself. Matter interacting with other 
matter was the cause of motion within the physical realm. 
Instead of focusing upon the reasoning of the "mover" for 
motion, Galileo could concentrate on the observable, 
measurable, mechanical, quantitative, and ultimately 
predictable actions of celestial bodies in motion.
According to Oelschlaeger, the picture of the natural world, 
accordingly, was radically changed for Galileo. The theory 
of inertia explained the motion of both the heaven and the
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earth, and there was therefore only one true science —  
physics —  and God played a very small role in it.
However, Galileo did not divorce final cause from the
entirety of the modern worldview, but merely from the
scientific understanding and treatment of the physical
world. According to Oelschlaeger:
Nature as system of matter-in-motion was to be 
understood through knowledge of efficient cause 
and inertial motion, not final cause; but the 
traditional Judeo-Christian view of nature as 
an earthly abode designed by God in Heaven for 
humankind was left intact (Oelschlaeger, 80).
Most of the great names in early modern science, according
to Glacken, did not deny design in nature nor the validity
of final causes. The Copernican and Galilean theories had
not called God or his creative act into question; the
cosmic system was a product of divine design and order.
Galileo's treatment of the natural world understood 
from the perspective of efficient cause inspired the thought 
of Isaac Newton. With Newton the world was finally 
comprehended under a unified, dynamic mechanical system. 
Newton showed the laws of the universe to exemplify one 
gigantic mathematical harmony moving to the music of the 
dynamic principles established by terrestrial experiment, 
and induction by Galileo and himself. With Newton, the 
world was not only thought of as a machine, but was 
exhibited in detail as a function of mechanical law —  a 
system of the world. All matters of celestial and 
terrestrial mechanics, found among Kepler, Copernicus, and
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Galileo, were unified into a grand system of mathematical-
mechanical laws (Hurlbutt 1965, 5).
Newton's mechanical-geometrical conception of the
world order, however, provided him with the basis for his
theological inquiries. The law of gravity, the law of
optics, the laws of organisms, all exhibit order and system
—  an exquisite design that inherently implies a designer.
According to Robert Hurlbutt:
with Newton the system of the world was held to 
be so beautifully displayed, its cognitive 
character so well determined, its mechanism so 
clearly formulated in terms of mathematical 
proportions that the designer could be 
specified as an intelligent geometer...In the 
Godhead, therefore Newton locates by the final 
cause, the ultimate purpose of the universe, 
the forms of patterns, and the efficient cause 
—  the beginning of motion (Hurlbutt, 79).
This use of scientific notions in theology provided
theologians with a reinvigorated design and teleological
argument that dominated religious thought for a century or
more and provided the beginnings of the scientific
counterreaction to Modernism.
The Initial Scientific Counterreaction: Phvsico-Theoloqists
The scientific counterreaction to Modernism was 
grounded in an attempt to recast traditional philosophical 
and religious beliefs in a manner consistent with the 
onslaught of scientific knowledge. Most seminal scientific 
thinkers, however, retained some belief in final cause. 
According to Glacken:
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It is true that [Galileo's and Newton's] 
scientific method could do without teleological 
explanation; the basic forces controlling 
creation could be stated in mathematical terms, 
and teleology could be put to one side, or 
survive in the form of conventional piety. It 
is not so easy, however, to ignore its hold on 
the earth and life sciences from the 
seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries 
(Glacken, 505).
Although efficient cause supplanted final cause within the 
scientific paradigm, there was within the scientific 
community a developing minority tradition that did not 
wholly embrace the mechanistic worldview. Such scientists 
believed the factual evidence about the world and the . 
creatures in it supported the idea of a divine plan.
The physico-theologist movement (also known as natural
theology) led the early challenge to the mechanistic science
of Modernism. "Many of these [thinkers]", as Glacken notes;
emphasized the significance of organic 
interrelationships on the earth, and their 
views are not unlike modern ideas of the 
balance and order of nature. There are, 
however, two significant differences. The 
destructive interferences of human cultures on 
the balance and harmony of nature did not enter 
into their works, and the harmonies, the 
adaptations of organisms to the environment and 
to each other, were works performed by God at 
the creation. The emphasis was therefore on 
form, adaptation, and arrangement, not on 
growth and development as in modern 
evolutionary theory (Glacken, 393).
John Ray's work, The Wisdom of God Manifested in the Works
of the Creation, provides an example of the physico-
theological position. It examines the nature of the earth
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and the natural harmonies observable on it, and attempts to 
find a place for man and his labors in it as well.
Ray (1627-1705) argued that nature could not be
understood simply as inert matter-in-motion, believing that
the biological and geological evidence overwhelmingly
indicated that nature was more than a mere collection of its
parts. Mechanistic materialism, therefore, had failed to
account for nature as actually observed (Oelschlaeger, 101).
In spite of the apparent success that physical science
claimed in explaining the motion of strictly material
objects, Ray argued that there was no conflict between faith
and reason when it came to the world of animate-matter-in-
motion. According to Glacken:
To Ray, a belief in the constancy of nature, in 
the consistent fertility and fruitfulness of 
the earth, is not only a logical inference from 
the divine plan, but is warranted by the
evidences of contemporary observation; it is 
obvious from the use men make of natural
products about them...[we may see in the
natural products] the wisdom of God in
supplying man with the means of lifting himself 
out of savagery, for without them we could have 
'nothing of Culture or civility' (Glacken,
419) .
For Ray then, the world was far too complex and diverse to 
be explained or understood through Newtonian mechanics. 
Nature was incomprehensible without the notion of a supreme 
creator and, accordingly, Ray attacked the Cartesian- 
Newtonian scientific program and developed a positive 
account of nature as a living entity created by God 
(Oelschlaeger, 101).
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Ray's discussion of nature as the result of a divine 
plan or final cause was not an attempt to overthrow the new 
scientific paradigm. "At first," according to Worster, "Ray 
attempted to salvage the mechanical philosophy from the 
abuses of those who were using it to account for nature 
without the intervention and assistance of any superior 
immaterial agent" (Worster, 42). However, as a natural 
historian, he did understand the vast amount of information 
that seemed consistent with the machine metaphor.
Accordingly Ray struck a compromise: he could not find
sufficient reason through efficient cause to explain the 
harmonious interrelations among the diverse elements of the 
natural world, for these testified to the existence of a 
divine creator (Oelschlaeger, 102). God, for Ray, did exist 
and he, in turn, designed a world which worked on the 
observable principles of mathematics and mechanics.
The significance of Ray’s work is that it represented 
an impressive command of the knowledge of natural history in 
an attempt to demonstrate that unity existed in nature and 
that this unity was a result of a creative process started 
and maintained by God (Glacken, 416). Ray's work, however, 
did not go beyond the anthropomorphic framework provided by 
Judeo-Christianity. Although the natural abundance of the 
world was not designed specifically for man, Ray accepted 
the biblical interpretation for its exploitation. According 
to Glacken:
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Ray considers the planet as a unit...This view 
of man in his relation to the earth is a 
gracious, almost idyllic, one: a friendly
abode for man has been created by Ray's 
beneficent Creator...and grateful man...uses 
the beautiful earth...even though is was not 
designed especially for him (Glacken, 421).
Ray advocated a kind of Christian stewardship of the earth,
but the events of the nineteenth century, the work of Darwin
and then Marsh, destroyed the notions of a designed earth
and with it, the ethic of Christian stewardship
(Oelschlaeger, 103).
Ray had planted the initial seed of ecology in his 
fusion of natural history into a comprehensive theory of 
unity. From Ray's seminal work two major traditions in 
ecology emerged in this early period. According to Donald 
Worster:
The first was an 'arcadian' stance toward 
nature, epitomized by Gilbert White, the parson 
naturalist of Selborne. This arcadian view 
advocated a simple, humble life for man with 
the aim of restoring him to a peaceful 
coexistence with other organisms. The second, 
an 'imperial' tradition, is best represented 
in the work of Carl Linnaeus —  the key 
ecological figure of the age —  and of the 
Linnaeans generally. Their ambition was to 
establish, through the exercise of reason and 
by hard work, man's dominion over nature 
(Worster, 2).
During the time, the scientific community was moving more 
and more into the confines of Modernism —  abstract physical 
and chemical theories that interpreted the natural world as 
mere matter-in-motion and sought above all else knowledge of 
efficient cause (Oelschlaeger, 104).
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Arcadian and Imperial Science
The Arcadians were a minority in the scientific 
community, inspired by the work of Ray. Arcadian scientists 
did not seek the knowledge of efficient causes, but rather 
an understanding of the whole of the natural world and how 
each component related with other components. This work was 
epitomized by Gilbert White (1720-1793). White, along with 
Ray, had long observed nature and wielded an impressive 
knowledge of natural history. However, White had a 
philosophic dimension beyond Ray and his physico-theological 
leanings which ultimately interpreted the world with a 
utilitarian palette. This dimension in White's concept of 
ecology was the arcadian harmony with nature as he found it 
in his rural life. White's appreciation of nature roust be 
viewed in terms of his shared environment. His was an 
idyllic, pastoral setting that allowed for appreciation, as 
opposed to the American pioneer experience that left no time 
for appreciation. "But, the overwhelming impression in 
[White's] arcadian writing," notes Worster, "is of a man 
eager to accept all nature into his parish sympathies" 
(Worster, 10). Ecology for White was thus a means not to 
the Cartesian end of power over nature but rather to 
recreate or rediscover and maintain a primal bond with the 
natural world (Oelschlaeger, 104).
White's arcadian ecology, however, was not only 
ignored for almost a half-century, (England was too busy
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consolidating and adjusting to the processes of 
modernization to read about the "crinking of field 
crickets") but was rivalled in the eighteenth century by 
imperial ecology, a tradition that sought to control nature 
and made that one of humankind's most important ends 
(Worster, 29). The Swedish botanist Carl von Linne (1707- 
1778, also know as Linnaeus, is recognized as the leading 
figure in imperial ecology. For Linnaeus, humans occupied a 
special place of dignity and honor in nature. He declaring 
that "Everything may be made subservient to [human] use" 
(Worster, 37). Linnaeus was both Cartesian, in his attempt 
to classify clearly and distinctly all the natural world, 
and Baconian in his belief that the end of such knowledge 
was the control of nature (Oelschlaeger, 105).
The control of nature by man, in a Linnaean framework, 
used as its root metaphor the notion of nature as a machine. 
Linnaeus' believed that a creator had designed an integrated 
order in nature which functioned like a single, universal, 
well-oiled machine. Accordingly, all parts of nature took 
on the aspects of machines. Elements of nature were 
interchangeable, expendable, and had in them only 
instrumental, utilitarian value. Most importantly, the 
Linnaean, imperial view found it helpful to ignore any 
aspect of nature that could not be made to fit into this 
mechanical picture (Worster, 40). God and humankind stood 
above and outside of the rest of creation.
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Counterreactions to the science of Modernism, 
beginning with the physico-theologists and continuing 
through the arcadian tradition, never seriously challenged 
the notion that nature might be for man's use. "Both the 
'mechanick philosophers1 and the physico-theologists," 
according to Glacken, "were united...in the goal of man's 
attaining control over nature..." (Glacken, 426). The 
challenge from the physico-theologists leveled itself 
against what they perceived as science's removal of God from 
natural history. The physical sciences' use of the 
mechanistic and mathematical equations to divide the natural 
world into measurable, quantifiable units seemed to be the 
first steps in which the divine controlling hand would be 
replaced by the fortuitous movement of brute matter 
(Worster, 40). These counterreactionaries were of the 
opinion that it was not their duty to keep the world free of 
its use scientific thought, but rather to place God back 
into its equations and return humankind to harmony with 
nature.
Darwin and Marsh
The publication of two works —  Charles Darwin's 
Origin of Species in 1859 and George Marsh's Man and Nature 
in 1863 —  shattered the foundations of the idea of a 
divine, pre-established harmony between humankind and the 
natural world that Ray, White, and Linnaeus presupposed. It
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is in the works of Darwin and Marsh that the American
conservation movement found the basis for its scientific
support. According to Oelschlaeger:
the tension between science and theology, and 
the strain between the facts determined by 
research and traditional beliefs established by 
faith, soon rendered the argument from design 
untenable...divine providence was on the verge 
of becoming otiose within the framework of 
efficient causation (Oelschlaeger, 106).
Although he had grown up within a traditional Judeo-
Christian education, and was heavily influenced by the work
of the natural theologist William Paley, Darwin could not
rectify the design argument with his research: the facts of
nature could be basically explained by natural selection.
God, in turn, was evicted from the world of science.
Darwin's revolutionary thought, although falling 
within the purview of the scientific revolution, challenged 
the dominating scientific paradigm of the time. The science 
and physics of Modernism defended by Galileo, Descartes, and 
Newton did nothing to challenge the overall hegemony of the 
theology of their time. Science, they argued, was. a more 
perfect account of God's glory since he was the architect of 
the natural world and mathematics was a more accurate 
narration of God's creation (Oelschlaeger, 106). The 
implications of Darwin's thought regarding God's place in 
nature were much more profound.
The bedrock of the idea upon which Darwin built was 
that the overall survival of life upon the earth was
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socially determined (Worster, 156). Nature, Darwin 
observed, was a "web of complex relations" and no individual 
organism or species can live independently of that web.
Here Darwin shows the influence of the physico-theologist's 
view that nature was not a mere sum of its parts but a 
complex of intricate living interrelationships. According to 
Worster:
A parallel assumption was that even the most 
insignificant creatures [were] important to the 
welfare of their conjoining species; somewhere 
at least they are 'essential members of 
society, or at some former period may have been 
so’ (Worster, 156).
Much of Darwin's interest focused upon the relatedness of
species with their surrounding environment. Darwin
concluded from this evidence that nature was indeed one
grand scheme of cooperative integration.
Another important element in Darwin's thought was his
realization that no one species can hold a particular place
in nature forever. According to Darwin:
All organic beings are striving to seize on 
each place in the economy of nature...All we 
can do, is to keep steadily in mind that each 
organic being is striving to increase in a 
geometric ratio; that each at some period of 
its life, during some season of the year, 
during each generation or at intervals, has to 
struggle for life and to suffer great 
destruction (Darwin 1896, 94).
That nature could be imperfect and self-corrective through
competitive improvement in any one of its many parts was a
radical departure from the thought and belief system of the
time.
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11 It cannot be denied" according to Michael Ruse, "that
generally the Origin sparked an explosion" with ideas such
as a "web" of complex interrelations and nature as being a
self-corrective, imperfect system" (Ruse 1979, 203) .
However, the most important result of Darwin's thought,
aside from his ideas on the interconnectedness of nature,
was evolution's impact upon the perception of man's place in
nature. For those who were relatively unfettered by
orthodox religious beliefs, according to Ruse:
the question of man was fairly easy to answer.
Forget religion and let the 'facts' speak for 
themselves. For someone on the other side of 
the barrier for whom religion was paramount and 
the Bible was the authority, the question was 
again fairly easy to answer. God had created 
man miraculously in his own image. The person 
desperately in trouble by the question was the 
man in the middle —  the one who wanted to roll 
with the advances of science and who saw great 
virtues in evolutionism.. .but who was also keen 
to see man set apart, the favored of God (Ruse,
245) .
However, for Darwin there was to be no compromise: humans,
no less than any other organism, must be explained in purely
natural terms (Ruse, 248).
Darwin's evolutionary science ran against the idea of
humans being created by special circumstance, for the
evidence showed that humankind was inextricably related and
involved in an environment that was a world of biological
and geological variations exhibiting no tendency to a final
configuration. According to Darwin:
The main conclusion here arrived at, and now 
held by many naturalists who are well competent
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to form a sound judgment is that man is 
descended from some less highly organized 
form...[the] facts cannot be disputed. They 
have long been known, but until recently they 
told us nothing with respect to the origin of 
man. Now when viewed by the light of our 
knowledge of the whole organic world, their 
meaning is unmistakable. The great principle 
of evolution stands up clear and firm...He who 
is not content to look like a savage, at the 
phenomena of nature as disconnected, cannot any 
longer believe that man is the work of a 
separate act of creation...[the facts] all 
point in the plainest manner to the conclusion 
that man is the co-descendant with other 
mammals of a common progenitor 
(Darwin 1906, 620).
The human species was not seen as divinely ordained to
inherit the earth. Moreover, humankind was more deeply
involved in the "web of life” than the physico-theologists
and arcadian ecologist suspected.
One of the primary lessons that Darwin noted from his 
thought regarding evolution was that humans had not been 
created with special care in the image of God; therefore 
humans were to be considered one with all other species in a 
universal relationship with living things. According to 
Worster:
In the final analysis, the figure of Darwin 
must remain the most imposing and persuasive 
force behind the biocentric movement. 
Conservationist or not...he shared...a quality 
of feeling of nature that finally may be as 
important as any of his theories. It survived 
the shock of the Galapagos, the pessimism of 
Malthus, and the melancholy of reality of 
competitive selection...While he might agree 
that the natural world is not an altogether 
pleasant or happy place, he could not for that 
reason believe that man should repudiate it or 
feel himself superior to it. He never faltered
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in his belief that beyond humanity and its 
affairs lies a living ecological community that 
has always been man's ultimate home and kin 
(Worster, 187).
Darwin made it clear that humankind was not above and
outside of the world in which they resided, a position that
would be expressed in the second important critique of
Modernism.
The second scientific critique came in the form of 
George Marsh's volume, Man and Nature (also known by its 
second edition as The Earth as Modified bv Human Action). 
Having traveled broadly while in the Foreign Service under 
the Lincoln administration, Marsh was able to collect a vast 
amount of knowledge and evidence regarding human impact upon 
its environs. Considered to be the first modern volume on 
ecology, Man and Nature's impact can still be witnessed 
today insofar as the book remains to be in print. Humans, 
according to Marsh, on the whole, were a destabilizing agent 
in nature and these activities pointed to an uncertain 
future. "The object of the present volume is," according to 
Marsh:
to indicate the character and, approximately, 
the extent of the changes produced by human 
action in the physical conditions of the globe 
we inhabit; to point out the dangers of 
imprudence and the necessity of caution in all 
operations which, on a large scale, interfere 
with the spontaneous arrangements of the 
organic or the inorganic world; to suggest the 
possibility and the importance of the 
restoration of the disturbed harmonies and the 
material improvement of waste and exhausted 
regions; and, incidently, to illustrate the
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doctrine that man is, in both kind and degree, 
a power of a higher order than any of the other 
forms of animated life, which, like him, are 
nourished at the table of bounteous nature 
(Marsh 1907, vii).
Although writing clearly from what is an 
anthropocentric view of nature, Marsh's experience differed 
from that of previous naturalists. According to David 
Lowenthal:
Jefferson, Franklin, Benjamin Rush, and their 
contemporaries were absorbed by man's impact 
upon the environment, but regarded the 
transformation of nature as beneficent and 
desirable. The Jeffersonians thought almost 
every change an improvement...cultivating the 
wilderness transformed the countryside from 
primitive chaos to order and civilized beauty.
The characteristic attitude toward man and 
nature was well expressed by Vermonter Ira 
Allen; he praised the settler who 'sees the 
effect of his own powers, aided by the goodness 
of Providence1 (Lowenthal 1958, 250).
Most Americans before Marsh believed in the plenitude of
nature, the inexhaustibility of natural resources, and the
power of the rational mind to control and enhance wilderness
for man's benefit. Although Marsh acknowledged man's power
to have a profound impact upon his environment, he assessed
the results more realistically than did his predecessors
(Lowenthal, 251).
Marsh's thoughts regarding man and nature are 
straightforward. Beginning with a physical description of 
the Roman Empire, Marsh described the surrounding land of 
the Mediterranean stripped of all its natural defenses 
against the destructive forces both nature and humankind
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have to provide. Once humankind has conquered nature, Marsh
postulated, it cannot relax its care of it. "This lesson,"
writes Lowenthal, "led Marsh to consider the quality and
extent of human influence" upon its surroundings
(Lowenthal, 257). In their natural state, geographical and
environmental components generally exhibit change slowly.
However, according to Lowenthal:
man, especially civilized man, 'guided by a 
self conscious and intelligent will aiming as 
often at secondary and remote as immediate 
objects,1 transforms the environment rapidly.
The evidence convinced Marsh that human impact 
—  by contrast with that of animals —  was 
unique in scope and intensity 
(Lowenthal, 257).
No natural forces, Marsh concludes, balance human influence
over the material and natural world. The only limit to
humankind's impact upon nature and wilderness was its own
self-restraint.
As with so many early "ecological" thinkers, Marsh met 
nature and its wilderness with a divided mind and his 
opinions about it were qualified by his religious and 
philosophical leanings. Although he conceived of nature as 
being in unity, Marsh molded his Calvinism and Romanticism 
into a paean of humankind's place in nature. However, Marsh 
abhorred the mechanistic rationalism of the modern age. His 
view of a proper balance between humans and nature was 
modeled on Ray's notion of Christian stewardship. Marsh did 
not question humankind's superiority over nature, but he 
rebuked the senseless waste he observed being generated by
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the modern market economy. The conclusion of his volume 
appears remarkably modern in the depth of its ecological 
insight:
It is a legal maxim that 'the law concerneth 
itself not with trifles' ...but in the 
vocabulary of nature, little and great are 
terms of comparison only; she knows no trifles, 
and her laws are as inflexible in dealing with 
an atom as with a continent or a planet. . .human 
operations... therefore, do act in the ways 
ascribed to them, though our limited faculties 
are at present, perhaps forever, incapable of 
weighing their immediate, still more their 
ultimate, consequences. But our inability to 
assign definite values to these causes of the 
disturbance of natural arrangements is not a 
reason for ignoring the existence of such 
causes in any general view of the relations 
between man and nature, and we are never 
justified in assuming a force to be 
insignificant because its measure is unknown, 
or because no physical effect can now be traced 
to it as its origin (Marsh, 617).
It was not for nature's sake that Marsh wanted to protect it
against humans, but rather for humankind's sake. Nature.for
Marsh was neutral —  humans were the conscious and moral
agent (Lowenthal, 34 0).
The result of Darwin's and Marsh's thought proved to 
be a wrecking operation on the Baconian-Cartesian scientific 
paradigm of Modernism that sought to reduce nature to inert, 
dead, quantitative matter, devoid of any intrinsic value for 
its subsequent exploitation in a world market economy. The 
cumulative effect of the inherent contradictions between 
faith and reason, and the ongoing course of the scientific 
and industrial revolutions, helped engendered the downfall
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of an entire ideology (Oelschlaeger, 109). According to 
Worster:
By the 1850's the synthesis of piety and 
science represented by Linnaeus, Ray, and White 
had been reduced to a cracked and dried- out 
shell; little of its vitality remained...as 
much as [Thoreau] delighted to linger with the 
older generation of naturalists, he discovered 
that he had to 'come down' a good distance; 
their carefully constructed world of 
intermeshed science and religious values was no 
longer tenable (Worster, 63).
The position of humankind over nature had been dealt a
serious blow by Darwin. The power of Darwin's thought can
be understood in terms of the context and paradigm against
which he railed. Darwin had undone in a single volume what
had been developing in Western thought for nearly two
millennia.
The physico-theologists' idea of humankind and nature
as God's creations helped provide the initial scientific
counterreaction to the Baconian-Cartesian science of
Modernism. Although their theoretical framework ultimately
failed, with the breakdown of the doctrines of special
creation and preestablished harmony, and the collapse of the
argument for design and final cause, their movement, in
terms of conservation at least, had a positive impact. "The
road of the physico-theologists", according to Glacken:
was more winding [than Modernism's science] and 
there were blind alleys...Much later...when it 
became apparent that man's stewardship of 
nature was no longer an accurate description of 
his role, there was disillusionment, and with 
it the realization that man could relentlessly 
destroy nature in ways that they did not even
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suspect themselves capable of, that many of 
their efforts were not divinely guided...[and] 
that they could not be dignified by identifying 
them with the Creator's purpose. The real 
contribution of physico-theology...was that it 
saw living interrelationships in nature 
concretely. It documented them. It had 
already —  before Darwin's 'web of life' —  
prepared men for the study of ecology 
(Glacken, 427).
Considering the unity of nature and nature as non-mechanic, 
physico-theology and arcadian ecology led to the 
revolutionary thought of Darwin and Marsh and ultimately 
helped to shape recent perceptions of humans and their 
relationship with their environment. Although contemporary 
ecology is devoid of theological considerations, the 
underlying notion that every element in an ecosystem has a 
role to play is historically grounded in the natural 
theology of the physico-theologists and arcadians 
(Oelschlaeger, 109).
The reaction to Modernism's philosophy and worldview 
occurred through a variety of different forms of thought.
As described in this and the preceding chapters, the 
counterreaction occurred at the literary, philosophical, and 
scientific levels. These literary and philosophical 
counterreaction traditions came to form the core of the 
preservationist movement. The scientific counterreaction 
for the most part, however, was used to support 
conservationist arguments, although the scientific 
counterreaction would eventually manifest itself much later
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in the preservation movement with the advent of the science 
of ecology. As will be seen in the following chapter, 
Marsh's work was used to argue for wise management of 
natural resources, not their preservation. As such, the 
conservation movement used the scientific counterreaction 
in manner which would defend, not challenge, the modern 
notions of growth and productivity and nature as a material 
resource.
CHAPTER 6
PRESERVATION AND CONSERVATION: THE PARADIGMATIC TENSION
Introduction
As noted in the previous chapters, there were several 
levels of counterreaction to the dominant paradigm of 
Modernism. Each of these, in turn, came to have an impact 
upon the politics of American wilderness. The philosophical 
and literary counterreactions were articulated in the 
preservationist arguments for wilderness. The scientific 
counterreaction was articulated in conservationist arguments 
that sought only to manage and regulate, not challenge, the 
growth and progress advocated by Modernism. This chapter, 
then, explores the tension between the two competing 
paradigms represented by the preservationist and 
conservationist attitudes towards wilderness.
Preservation and Conservation 
Although their ultimate ends were both 
anthropocentric, conservation and preservation differed in 
terms of their paradigmatic implications. Preservationists 
represented an shift away from Modernism, appealing to the 
aesthetic, spiritual, and cultural properties of wilderness
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for the development of the individual, and stood firm in its 
challenge to the unrestrained growth inherent in Modernism. 
Moreover preservationists argued for a conceptual framework 
that no longer held humans outside and above of nature. 
Preservationists became increasingly willing to sacrifice 
the gains of civilization and Modernism's technology and 
progress for the benefits that they saw offered to the 
individual and society by pristine stands of untrammeled 
wilderness.
Conservationists on the other hand saw conservation of
natural resources as necessary for materialistic and
economic purposes. Conservation did not, therefore,
challenge the dominant social paradigm outright, although it
did find it necessary to take into account the scientific
observations advanced by Darwin and Marsh, e.g., humankind's
place in nature and watershed protection. The conservation
movement is best illustrated by figures such as Gifford
Pinchot who believed that forests could provide a
sustainable yield of timber while providing for multiple use
as well. According to Pinchot:
The earth and its resources belong of right to 
its people. Without resources life itself is 
impossible. From birth to death, natural 
resources, transformed for human use, feed, 
clothe, shelter, and transport us...Without 
abundant resources prosperity is out of reach.
Therefore the conservation of natural resources 
is the fundamental material problem. It is the 
open door to economic and political 
progress...The first duty of the human race on 
the material side is to control the use of the 
earth and all that therein is. Conservation
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means the wise use of the earth and its 
resources for the lasting good of men 
(Pinchot 1987, 505).
According to Worster, this conservationism was a set of
ideals wholly compatible with industrialism. The challenge
for the conservationists was to manage and regulate forests
in the most efficient and economically feasible manner
possible, not to preserve wilderness.
Early Arguments for Preservation 
It was during the middle of the nineteenth century 
that preservation became the major vehicle for a national 
discussion of wilderness. Seminal appreciation for 
wilderness in America at this time, built upon Thoreau's 
notion that wildness and refinement were not fatal extremes 
but equally beneficent influences, led to the sadness at its 
disappearance from the American scene (Nash, 96). Romantic 
and nationalists' interest for wilderness grew during this 
time? however, few thought of being able to challenge 
successfully the ideas of progress and the claims made by 
civilization endorsed by Modernism. Preservation of 
wilderness was almost incomprehensible in the social, 
political, and economic climate of the time.
There were, however, Romantic arguments being made for 
the preservation of wilderness. Like other early supporters 
of wilderness such as John Audubon and George Catlin,
Thoreau was disturbed at the disappearance of American
wilderness. The less there was of it, the greater the
chance for an unhealthy and spiritually weakened society.
Nash notes that in 1854, while he was faced with the
prospect of a totally civilized America. Thoreau concluded:
The kings of England formerly had their forests 
'to hold the king's game,' for sport or food, 
sometimes destroying villages to create or 
extend them; and I think that they were 
impelled by a true instinct. Why should not 
we, who have renounced the king's authority, 
have our national preserves, where no village 
need be destroyed, in which the bear and 
panther, and some even of the hunter race, may 
still exist...—  our forests, not to hold the 
king's game merely, but to hold and preserve 
the king himself also, the lord of creation, —  
not for idle sport or food, but for inspiration 
and our own re-creation (Thoreau 1985, 712).
Thoreau recognized in this claim that wilderness was needed
not only for the health of the individual, but for the
nation as well.
Thoreau made his claim again for preservation of wild 
spaces while living in a number of small Massachusetts 
townships in 1859. Thoreau concluded that each of them 
should have a park or primitive forest of five hundred to a 
thousand acres, and that the public should hold these areas 
as preserved from any commercial interests. Several decades 
of wilderness appreciation, developed through an American 
sense of "wilderness" nationalism, can be seen as 
culminating in Thoreau's defense of this proposal: "let us
keep the New World new, preserve all the advantages of 
living in [this] country" (Thoreau 1906, 387), Thoreau of 
course qualified his argument by indicating that only a few
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areas be kept completely wild, while the rest would be 
preserved as pastoral enclaves. However, in preserving the 
benefits of wilderness, Thoreau saw the preservation of 
civilization.
Where Thoreau had taken up the Romantic cause for 
preservation, George P. Marsh argued the case of 
conservation for more economic reasons: the earth's ability
to sustain humankind's consumptive predilections. Clear- 
cutting of forests near watersheds, Marsh concluded, 
resulted in environmental calamities such as droughts, 
floods, and soil erosion. Such disaster could lead, as in 
the case of the Roman empire, to the downfall of entire 
civilizations. In Marsh's opinion the most efficient way to 
maintain waterflow and supply was to maintain a healthy 
forest around its watershed. Under the auspices of Marsh's 
insight, conservation gained an economic justification and 
subsequently was made compatible with progress and economic 
welfare as well (Nash, 105).
The Adirondack Preserve
Although Yellowstone National Park represents the
first instance of large-scale wilderness preservation in the
public's interest, the first instance of wilderness
preservation can be seen in New York's forest preserve in
the Adirondacks in 1885. As Nash points out:
With [this] milestone in the early history of 
American wilderness preservation, the ideas of
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Catlin, Thoreau,... and Marsh bore fruit. Yet 
in...[this] case the rationale for action [did 
not] take account of the aesthetic, spiritual, 
or cultural value which had previously 
stimulated appreciation. In New York the 
decisive argument concerned the necessity of 
forested land for an adequate water supply 
(Nash, 108).
The Preserve Act was initially the result of the scientific 
counterreaction to Modernism as seen in Marsh's arguments 
for watershed protection, not preservationist arguments.
The science employed in defense of this act was used for 
economic and commercial gain, and failed to represent a 
revolutionary shift away from Modernism. The Preserve Act 
never challenged the idea of progress directly. Wilderness 
was preserved unintentionally.
The initial "non-commercial" appreciation of the 
Adirondacks was held by individuals who appreciated the more 
cerebral and spiritual delights that the Adirondacks 
offered. Much of the area had been left undeveloped as the 
nation's population headed. As the population of New York 
city burgeoned, and more and more people became engaged in 
the urban experience, urban dwellers began looking to the 
peace and serenity offered by the large stands of 
undeveloped forest land that were the Adirondacks. To the 
middle-class urbanite this area represented an "enchanted 
island" where city life, often tedious and complex, could be 
left behind for the simple and untamed splendor of this area 
(Nash, 116).
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While appreciation for the area grew, so too did the 
attention being made of the loss of its wilderness 
qualities. Initially the idea was to prevent industrial 
development from occurring in areas designated as preserves. 
These same industrial pressures however would find relief in 
those other areas not marked for preservation. Thus a 
balance was struck between the pressures upon the region for 
enjoyment and utility.
This idea of a balance having been struck is 
important. In suggesting that the areas not preserved be 
open to development, the supporters of a wilderness preserve 
did not place themselves in opposition directly to the 
forces of Modernism —  progress and industry. Rather they 
argued that the reserve, in preserving timber and 
maintaining the watershed, would guarantee an adequate and 
constant supply of drinking water for the city of New York, 
as well as helping to maintain the state's canal system, 
which provided for a cheap form of transportation.
Wilderness preservation and commercial prosperity were 
synthesized. However much the Romantics desired 
preservation for non-utilitarian purposes, they realized 
that they could not defend their position without accepting 
the argument for watershed protection based on Marsh's 
observations (Nash, 118).
By the 1880's, declining water levels began to appear 
in the Erie and Hudson water systems causing the argument
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for preservation of the upland forest to intensify. Where
resident's of New York had been indifferent to previous
arguments, they now became enraged by lumber and mining
practices alleged to be taking place in the Adirondacks.
According to Nash:
It was predicted that without protection of the 
woodlands municipal water supplies could run 
dry and periodic droughts [would] render the 
state waterway useless. At other times 
disastrous floods might inundate the lowlands.
Obviously the effect upon commerce would be 
catastrophic...merchants believed that if 
drought eliminated the Erie-Hudson route as a 
means of shipping goods, railroads would have a 
monopoly and be able to raise rates at will.
It would not require a love of wilderness to 
come to the defense of the Adirondacks on these 
grounds (Nash, 119).
Put to the business community in these terms, the New York
Chamber of Commerce, under the leadership of Morris K.
Jessup, joined the fight for preservation. In May of 1885
the Governor of New York, David Hill, approved a bill
establishing 715,000 acres as preserve that were to remain
undeveloped in an effort to maintain the Hudson and Erie
waterways and New York with a constant supply of water
(Schaefer 1989, xxi).
In terms of a shift away from Modernism, the 
Adirondack preserve offered limited success. Initial 
Romantic aims may have flown in the face of the dominant 
social paradigm of the time, but its advocates were all too 
aware of the social, political, and economic atmosphere of 
the time as determined by the paradigm of Modernism. The
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Romantics deemed their position untenable without the 
support of the economic, commercial interests. This is not 
to say, however, that the Romantic position had failed to 
make an impact.
Although conservation arguments carried the day for 
the initial preserve act in 188 5, New York legislators in 
1892 redesignated the reserve as a state park partially for 
the reason to offer overworked urban folk a chance to get 
away from the pressures of life in Gotham. The wording of 
the act is indicative of the Romantic's impact and a 
subsequent shift of position: Adirondack State Park was to
be "ground open for the free use of all the people for their 
health and pleasure, and as forest land necessary for the 
preservation of the headwaters of the chief rivers of the 
state, and as a future supply of timber"
(New York Laws, quoted by Nash, 120). Moreover, during New 
York's constitutional convention of 1894, proponents 
favoring the assurance of the preserve's protection (mainly 
commercial interests from New York) asked that guarantees be 
written into the constitution itself. Although the 
commercial (conservationist) argument was used, David 
McClure, the attorney hired to defend the preserve, declared 
that the first reason for the preserves purpose was that it 
was a place for New York's citizen's to rest and recuperate 
in the quiet and solitude offered only in wilderness. The 
people of New York, as represented by members of the
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Constitutional Convention, invested control of the 
Adirondacks to the people of the state and secured the area 
as "forever kept as wild forest lands" (Schaefer, xxi).
According to Nash, the watershed argument had been the 
mainstay earlier in the defense of wilderness, but by the 
1890's those seeking to justify the preserving of 
wilderness began to turn more and more to preservationist 
arguments. The Romantic concern for aesthetics and culture 
had achieved, under the aegis of the New York State 
Constitution, the same legal recognition as conservationist 
arguments at the state level. The rationale for wilderness 
preservation was slowly coming together with the ideology of 
appreciation (Nash, 121) These Romantic, preservationist 
arguments were, in turn, even more forceful in the creation 
of the nation's National Park Service.
The National Park Service
To understand better the creation of the National Park 
Service, it is necessary first to discuss a key element 
contributing to its creation —  the national parks. The 
creation of National Parks, like the New York state Forest 
Preserve Act, did not initially set wilderness aside for the 
sake of wilderness. Yellowstone was created in an attempt 
to protect its natural "curiosities" and "wonders" from 
private exploitation. "In this manner," according to Nash, 
"the right of the public to see these sights would be
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safeguarded and the scenery itself saved from defacement" 
(Nash, 110). When first declared a national park, the area 
of Yellowstone Park included more that 3,300 square miles. 
The reason for such a vast area, it was argued, was to 
protect undiscovered wonders in the area —  wilderness did 
not figure into the initial plans for park preserves 
(Runte 1979, 34).
Much of the argument in the preservation of scenic 
wonders in the American landscape came as a result of the 
translation of the Romantic aesthetic appreciation of 
wilderness into a notion of national pride. Such natural 
wonders such as the Yosemite Valley in California, or the 
geysers in Yellowstone, were seen to help make up for what 
America lacked culturally. Preservation of wilderness 
areas, especially those with spectacular scenic displays, 
became the preservation of American heritage. Where Europe 
could boast the Louvre and the Coliseum, the United States 
could boast unique, monumental, natural features such as 
those found in its national parks. "To ignore the 
threatened confiscation of Yellowstone's wonders by private 
interests," writes Runte, "would [have been perceived as 
saying] that the United States had no pride in its culture" 
(Runte, 44).
The desire to preserve wilderness was not without 
scientific interest. Beside attempts at protecting scenic 
wonders, there were attempts at preserving unique scientific
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phenomenon found in America's wilderness which culminated in
the Antiquities Act of 1906. Introduced by Iowa congressman
John Lacey, himself a staunch preservationist, the bill
sought to preserve all objects of historic or cultural
interest that are situated upon the lands owned or
controlled by the Government of the United States
(Runte, 71). Although the focus of the bill was not the
scenic splendor found in national parks, Lacey's intent used
the same rationale for the national parks: protection of
America's cultural heritage.
Although preservation was gathering strength in the
early twentieth century as reflected in the growing number
of national parks and monuments at the time, the movement
suffered a major set back with the loss of Hetch Hetchy
Valley in the Yosemite National Park in December of 1913 to
hydroelectric development for San Francisco. It was at this
time, that a majority of the preservationists agreed that
the national parks could not be defended by the traditional
Romantic arguments of national pride, culture, or scenery
alone. "As a result," according to Runte:
...pirating the slogans of utilitarian 
conservation, preservationists followed Muir in 
defending the national parks as a means of 
preventing 'waste' in their own right. As 
distinct from proper management of the national 
forests, the stakes were merely in terms of 
human 'efficiency'. But if 'we must consider 
[the national parks] from the commercial 
standpoint,1 Allen Chamberlin, a New England 
advocate said, 'let it not be forgotten that 
Switzerland regards its scenery as a money- 
producing asset to the extent of some two
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hundred millon dollars annually.' When further 
tied to scenic nationalism, nothing did more 
for the preservationist cause. As far back as 
the creation of Yellowstone National Park in 
1872, the railroads of the West promoted scenic 
protection...in the appreciation that the 
attraction of more tourists into the region 
meant greater revenues. Increasingly cognizant 
of the significance of this fact, 
preservationist turned to the railroads for 
political and financial aid during 
[preservation] campaigns. The rewards of this 
'pragmatic alliance1 were soon confirmed by the 
growing public support for a bureau of national 
parks, an agency fully committed to the 
principles of [aesthetic] as opposed to 
utilitarian conservation (Runte, 83).
Such was the situation at the time of the founding of the
National Park service.
The passage of the National Park Service legislation 
in 1916 represents the last major success of what is known 
in American history as the Progressive Movement. The 
failure of preservationists to protect Hetch Hetchy from 
development, and the need to communicate their philosophy, 
caused members of the movement to reevaluate the traditions 
and reasoning behind their movement (Runte, 84). Scenic 
preservation was clearly an established value in the 
movement and it was made clear that at its roots the 
preservationists remained firmly committed to its Romantic 
heritage.
The call for national parks and a government service 
to run them was supported by a wide variety of groups and 
individuals such as the Sierra Club, the Boone and Crockett 
Club, various garden, women's, and horticultural clubs. To
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these were added recently urbanized country dwellers whose 
memories of rural hardships were quickly ended by the 
"confinement of city streets" (Runte, 85). What developed 
in the cities and urban fringes was a continuation of the 
romanticized version of wilderness in America. "Even at the 
price of one or two hours of commuting, many thought the 
opportunity to escape from the grime...and overcrowding of 
city life was a welcome relief" (Runte, 85). It was among 
these urban dwellers that the large majority of national 
park supporters were to be found.
Although much of the support for the parks remained 
aesthetic, in the long run the dominant social and political 
atmosphere made it necessary to associate scenic protection 
with more utilitarian economic growth in an effort to defend 
the idea of a national park system. As with the 
preservation of the Adirondacks in New York, aesthetics 
alone could not defend the preservationist movement. It 
followed that as preservationists played their hand before 
Congress, the monetary appeal of scenic protection remained 
a trump (Runte, 100). Instead of the standard 
preservationist cry for scenery and aesthetics, arguments 
for the National Park Service ranged from the need to keep 
tourism within the United States, to the need for providing 
areas of rest and relaxation for working persons in an 
attempt to maintain high levels of worker productivity. For 
the purpose of passing the park service bill, first
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introduced in 1911, parks were linked to the idea of 
utilitarian conservation rather than outright aesthetic 
preservation.
As Runte notes, the idea of linkage to conservation 
seemed incongruous with traditional preservationist values, 
but it was accurate reflection of the quiet desperation the 
preservationists felt with the loss of Hetch Hetchy.
Further, preservationists took comfort from the support of 
the railroads, whose promotion of the national parks 
confirmed that the park idea was in fact coming into its 
own. The efforts of Senator Reed Smoot of Utah to win 
passage of the Park Service bill added to the growing 
prestige of aesthetic conservation (Runte, 101).
What was achieved under the passage of the bill in 1916 was 
the association of scenic preservation in the national parks 
with the country's economic health.
Preservationists arguing for the establishment of the
National Park Service again could not in the social,
political, and economic climate of the time succeed without
invoking commercial and economic language of the
conservationists. The Romantic roots can be clearly seen,
however, at the heart of the National Parks Service Act.
The fundamental purpose of the National Park Service was to:
conserve the scenery and the natural and 
historic objects and the wild life therein and 
to provide for the enjoyment of the same in 
such manner and by such means as will leave 
them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future
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generations (U.S. Department of the Interior, 
quoted by Runte, 104).
The aesthetic preservationists had succeeded in gaining an
agency whose purview reflected their own and which helped to
counter their losses at Hetch Hetchy.
The paradigmatic implications of the establishment of
the National Park Service must be considered in terms of its
Romantic roots. Although the preservationist dressed their
efforts in the language of economic utility in an effort to
garner support for their bill, its central purpose, the
preservation of America's natural scenery, always remained.
Where New York's Adirondack Preserve Act initially reflected
commercial leanings and did little to challenge the dominant
social paradigm, the National Parks Service Act was from its
inception influenced by preservationist forces and employed
conservationist language only in an effort to secure its
more Romantic aims.
Defense of Dinosaur National Monument 
Half a century after the passing of the National Park 
Service Act, the aesthetic sensibilities, wilderness 
rationale, and the political skill of the preservationists 
were tested again in a nationwide debate over the future of 
a part of the United State National Park System. The 
dispute arose over a proposed dam on the Green River at Echo
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Park which threatened to flood Dinosaur National Monument on 
the Colorado-Utah border.
In 1915 President Woodrow Wilson designated eighty 
acres in Utah, under the authority of the Antiquities Act of 
1906, for the purpose of protecting a deposit of dinosaur 
skeletons imbedded in a shale and sandstone ledge. The area 
was enlarged under the Roosevelt administration to include 
nearly one hundred miles of the deep river canyons of the 
Yampa and Green Rivers with their surrounding benchlands. 
However, the area had attracted not only paleontologists and 
wilderness enthusiasts but the hydro-electric engineers' of 
the multi-state Colorado River Storage Project. The 
project, sponsored by the Bureau of Reclamation, envisioned 
a ten-dam system that would provide agricultural interests 
in Nevada, Arizona, and California with adequate supplies of 
water and electricity. One of these dams, Echo Park, 
located on the Green River, threatened to flood the Monument 
with its resulting reservoir. Upon learning of the project, 
friends of the wilderness and the National Park protested. 
With the support of the water-conscious Southwest, 
reclamationists defended their proposal. The controversy 
quickly assumed major proportions, dominating conservation 
politics in the 1950's (Nash, 210).
As in the previous cases, it is necessary to 
understand the socio-political climate in which this case 
was operating. Post-war America was demanding a greater
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amount of power than ever before to fuel its burgeoning 
consumer society. Areas of the Southwest were becoming more 
and more dependent upon water from diverted sources to 
maintain their tenuous foothold in the marginal environment 
of the West. Even the Adirondacks, an area designated to be 
free of development forever, came under heavy pressure from 
hydro-electric interests. The preservationists were again 
under pressure to defend their notions of the aesthetic 
value of wilderness from commercial interests.
In the case of the defense of Dinosaur National
Monument, as with the other events previously discussed, not
only was it necessary for preservationist forces to have the
proper funding and publicity, but it was essential for them
to have a convincing argument. The preservationists brought
to bear the product of a century of thought regarding the
meaning and value of wilderness and remained with their
traditional Romantic roots. According to Nash:
Some arguments rested on the need of civilized 
man for wilderness sanctuaries which had 
precedents in the ideas of [Emerson], Thoreau, 
and Muir...In 1950 Ulysses S. Grant III, 
grandson of the President and himself the 
president of the American Planning and Civic 
Association, defended Dinosaur because 'our 
industrial civilization is creating an even 
greater need for the average man...to 
reestablish contact with nature...and to be 
diverted away from the whirling wheels of 
machinery and chance.' George Kelley,
representing the Colorado Forestry and 
Horticultural Association...point[ed] out that 
'wilderness areas have become to us a spiritual 
necessity, an antidote to the strains of modern 
living...[and allow people] to renew their
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souls and gain fresh perspective on life*
(Nash, 213) .
However, as the Congressional hearings on the Echo 
Park project continued in 1955, it was clear that the 
preservationists approached the problem with an additional 
resource. Rather than backing their traditional arguments 
with commercial arguments, as had been done in the two prior 
cases, the director of the Sierra Club at the time, David 
Brower, turned the scientific data offered by the government 
and its bureaus against them (Nash, 217).
The first tactic stemmed from the traditional Romantic
arguments of aesthetic and spiritual values of wilderness in
a materially driven, consumer society such as that found in
mid-twentieth century America. Preservationists questioned
whether the pioneer domination of wilderness was an
appropriate attitude for the twentieth century. Writer
Sigurd Olson, while addressing the Senate sub-committee,
pointed out that the frontiersman:
'did the job that needed to be done' but 
wondered if 'in our mad rush to dam every 
river, chop down every tree, utilize all 
resources to the ultimate limit...we might not 
destroy the very things that have made life in 
America worth cherishing and defending?1 
(Olson, quoted by Nash, 217).
The flooding of Dinosaur National Monument, Olson concluded,
threatened the very philosophical core of wilderness
appreciation and the intangible qualities that had evolved
through history to help shape the American character.
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While Olson and other wilderness advocates sounded the
Romantic battle cry once more, Brower challenged the Bureau
of Reclamation and the government with its own tools:
science, math, and statistics. Much of the Bureau's
argument for the project was based on its calculations
regarding the amount of water lost to evaporation. Their
claims asserted that the reservoir that would flood Dinosaur
National Monument was necessary to help maintain the water
supply as mandated in the Colorado River Compact of 1922.
Brower's testimony to the Senate's subcommittee claimed
exactly the opposite. According to Nash:
Brower's testimony presented the mathematics 
supporting his contention that the Bureau of 
Reclamation had erred in its calculation of the 
water that would be lost by evaporation from an 
Echo Park reservoir. Using the Bureau's own 
base figures, he showed that the lake would 
actually be far more costly in terms of water 
loss than advertised and that the alternative 
dam sites, outside wilderness areas, were 
preferable in this respect (Nash, 217).
Brower's contentions regarding the accuracy of the Bureau's
statistics not only called into question the economics of
the Echo Park reservoir but brought into question the entire
Colorado River Storage Project.
The preservationists had found their mark. Although 
the project had passed the Senate with approval, the House 
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs endorsed a version 
of the plan without the Echo Park Dam. The language of the 
bill, late in 1955, even included a statement that Congress 
would not allow any dam or reservoir to be built under the
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authorization of the act within any National Park or 
Monument. The bill setting the Colorado River Storage 
Project became law on April 11, 1956. The wilderness 
movement and preservationists, as Nash describes, had their 
finest hour. Basic to the preservationists' success, 
according to Nash, was the development of a convincing 
justification for the existence of wild country along with 
an increase in the number of Americans who subscribed to it. 
The justification, however, had to operate within a 
Modernist framework in that it had to address economic 
concerns and could not simply rest upon Romantic, 
preservationist arguments.
The defense of Dinosaur National Monument marked a 
success for the preservationist position. However, it 
marked as well the continuing tension between the dominant 
social paradigm and its counterreaction. Because Modernism 
was the dominant social paradigm, preservationists could not 
successfully argue for or defend their position without 
ultimately addressing conservationists' commercial (and 
scientific) concerns. The Romantic spiritual and aesthetic 
arguments of the preservationists had to be tempered with 
the economic reasoning of the conservationists to make their 
arguments justifiable.
EPILOGUE
According to Sheldon Wolin, the idea of paradigms is 
challenging in that it no longer allows for an "overly 
simplified view" of science, philosophy, worldviews, and the 
societal values they come to influence (Wolin, 131). A 
society's worldview can be seen as being conditioned by its 
dominant social paradigm, which provides it with a core 
cluster of beliefs, values, and ideals that influence their 
views regarding society itself, its government, and an 
individual's responsibility within society. However, these 
paradigms often fail to resolve adequately crises and 
anomalies within their interpretive framework and give rise 
to new, competing paradigms.
The importance of paradigms as an interpretive device, 
as this paper demonstrates, can be seen in the discussion of 
the history of American wilderness preservation and the 
development of the conservation movement. As previously 
indicated, there were two competing strains of thought 
articulated in the preservation and conservation movements, 
each representing a competing paradigm. The 
preservationists represented the literary and philosophical 
counterreactions to the dominant social paradigm of
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Modernism, while the conservationist represented the 
commercial and economic forces sanctioned by Modernism.
The politics of wilderness preservation can therefore 
be understood in light of the tension experienced between 
Modernism and its counterreaction, as seen in the history of 
American attitudes towards wilderness beginning in the late 
nineteenth century. While preservationists brought their 
"romantic" arguments to bear upon social issues affecting 
wilderness, it became clear that their position was 
untenable without employing commercial arguments as defined 
by Modernism as well. Although the preservationist 
arguments have gained some strength in the years since the 
late nineteenth century, the tension between conservationist 
and preservationist traditions continues to exist.
In paradigmatic terms, the failure of preservationists 
to successfully argue for wilderness preservation without 
addressing commercial interests reiterates the point that 
Modernism remains the dominant paradigm. Its theoretical 
and practical framework, at least in the area of wilderness 
preservation, remains viable and must therefore be 
interpreted as successfully meeting the challenges presented 
to it by its anomalies and crises. This paper, however, 
does not assume that Modernism is without critics and 
competition from other paradigms. This in turn warrants the 
question: Must there be a paradigmatic shift in order to
preserve wilderness for preservationist (spiritual) ends?
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The counterreactions to Modernism and its views on 
nature treated in this paper represent just one of many 
paradigmatic alternatives to Modernism. However, the 
alternative explored here keeps humankind as its focal 
element, as does Modernism. Both paradigms are 
anthropocentric. The paradigmatic shift then to preserve 
wilderness for preservationist ends need not be that 
drastic. One possible approach, then, to this question may 
be found in Albert Borgmann's work Technology and the 
Character of Contemporary Life.
According to Borgmann, Modernism's science and
technology have failed to live up to the promise of liberty,
prosperity, and individual development:
Technology is geared to meet challenges, to dam 
rivers, drain swamps, log forests, and mine 
coal. Wilderness areas within this framework, 
appear as the last bastions yet to be taken by 
technology, the last areas where we would be 
able to cut, drill, and extract. At the very 
least these areas should be made available as 
recreational resources. But wilderness is a 
challenge to this entire way of dealing with 
nature, i.e., to technology itself. In the 
controversies about the establishment of 
wilderness areas, the unspoken disagreement is 
always on how we should understand the 
challenge of nature, whether we should meet the 
challenge with domination or with respect 
(Borgmann 1984, 185).
While it is clear that Modernism's science and technology
has sought for the past three centuries to dominate nature,
Borgmann suggests that Romantic claims need not abandon its
homocentrism nor its science and technology in their
attempts at preservation.
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Humankind is indeed guilty of a violent past towards
nature through its use of science and technology in attempts
to secure the promise of Modernism. Nature was brought
under the domination of civilization in an effort to
liberate and enhance the human spirit. However, "[ojnce the
heedlessness of the exploitation of the natural resources
came to be recognized as a danger to the welfare of
technology," according to Borgmann:
the latter's conceptual resources...could be 
drawn upon to bring technology in balance with 
its physical setting. To act in the 
technological spirit of scientifically grounded 
security and stability is to have proper 
respect for the limits and fragility of the 
natural environment. It is consistent with 
that sort of respect to urge the protection and 
preservation of those parts of nature that are 
not known to be useful but may turn out to be 
so in the future (Borgmann, 185).
This of course is exactly the vein in which preservationists
have had to dress their arguments from the very beginning, a
tactic that is now failing them. Moreover, as Christopher
Stone notes:
When [preservationists] argue this way, to the 
exclusion of other arguments or find themselves 
speaking of "recreational interests" so 
continuously as to play up to and reinforce, 
homocentric perspectives, there is something 
sad about the spectacle. One feels that the 
arguments lack even their proponent's 
convictions. I expect that they want to say 
something less egoistic and more emphatic but 
the prevailing and sanctioned modes of 
explanation in our society are not quite ready 
for it (Stone 1974, 43).
117
How then can technology come to be used to argue for 
wilderness without surrendering completely to the Modernist 
forces technology has come to represent?
Technology may be utilized to support more spiritual
claims upon wilderness if technology can be reformed. The
first step in this process is the acceptance of the idea
that humankind's significance is best understood through its
engagement with things that are recognized and respected in
their own right. As Borgmann states:
we must distinguish, then, between the base 
anthropocentrism of mature technology and the 
higher anthropocentrism of the respect for 
things in their own right. We can also put the 
point in [an alternate manner] and say that the 
liberation of nature is inseparable from human 
liberation (Borgmann, 193).
Borgmann is not endorsing the impossible task of abandoning
technology. He is, rather, calling for a move away from the
base technology used in Modernism to a higher technology —
a technology that would take into account the fact that
humankind is best served by respecting the natural world in
its own right.
An element of this new maturity is simply the 
acceptance of technology with all of its possible disruptive 
forces. These forces do exist and, of course, cannot simply 
be ignored. As Borgmann indicates, respect for wilderness 
will never again be nourished by its formerly indomitable 
wildness (Borgmann, 194). Rather, respect for wilderness 
emanates from its fragility and vulnerability, especially in
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the face of technology. Where subduing wilderness teaches 
the acceptance of technology, humans also learn to respect 
the wilderness through technology's destructiveness 
(Borgmann, 194). This acceptance comes not from the 
resources or power that nature might provide but rather its 
beauty or spiritual qualities.
Science and technology, according to Modernism, is
infinite in its resourcefulness. However, in the
procurement of spiritual qualities, technology is indeed
limited. Technology, in fact, cannot overcome or secure it.
According to Borgmann:
[Technology] can procure something that engages 
us fully and in its own right only at the price 
of gutting or removing it. Thus wilderness 
teaches us not only to accept technology, but 
to limit it. The limitation of technology is 
an impossible task when it is undertaken with a 
view to technology only (Borgmann, 195).
However, when technology is understood in terms of
humankind's need for respectful engagement with the nature
that surrounds him, principled and sensible steps to
wilderness preservation are possible. In essence, humankind
can learn from wilderness that pretechnological experiences
and values are not lost in Modernism, merely blunted or
hidden and that a new, mature, technology that weds human
liberation with that of nature, might help humankind to
achieve them.
As history shows, preservationists need not 
necessarily witness a radical paradigm shift in order to
preserve wilderness for spiritual ends. However, while 
Modernism still dominates, preservationists will need to 
address its concerns to advance their ends. As suggested, 
technology may represent the key. A new, more mature view 
of technology, with its initial promise of enhancing and 
liberating mankind, could lead to the view of mankind’s 
liberation as inseparable from the liberation of nature. 
Although this view in itself represents a shift in 
technology's emphasis, an attempt at a new technology need 
not require a radical paradigmatic shift away from 
Modernism, merely a refocusing of technology's goals. In 
this scheme, technology and wilderness would no longer be at 
odds, allowing preservationists to employ technological, 
rather than commercial and economic, valuation in order to 
secure wilderness preservation for its spiritual ends.
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